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HUFF, JOHN W.

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EXAMINATION OF
MACAULAY'S ESSAY...

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Huff, John W

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

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


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AN EXAMINATION
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ON
RANKE'S HISTORY OF THE POPES:
WITH A FEW
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PRESS
ON
OTHER SUBJECTS.
BY
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Dr. Alfred Stillé,
with the kindest regards of
J. M. Stueff.

Philadelphia, Oct. 6, 1892.

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TO MY
DEAR AND HONORED FRIEND,
HENRY CAREY BAIRD,
This Volume
IS
AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED
IN
REMEMBRANCE OF THE CORDIAL PERSONAL AND BUSINESS RELATIONS
WHICH, FOR NEARLY FORTY YEARS, HAVE
EXISTED BETWEEN HIM AND
THE AUTHOR.

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PREFACE.

THE articles in this pamphlet were written many years ago. Why publish them now? Simply, to put them into the hands of a few select friends, who, whether they do or do not agree with me in my opinions, have, I feel quite assured, no doubt of my intellectual integrity.

I consider it my duty to render to FRANCIS HODGSON, D.D., the kindest and tenderest tribute of which I am capable. He was a controversialist of exceptional ability. If he had been trained by William Chillingworth or Jonathan Edwards, his logical attainments would unquestionably have enabled him to found a high reputation.

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MACAULAY'S ESSAY

ON

RANKE'S "HISTORY OF THE POPES."

THOUGH several years have elapsed since Mr. Macaulay's essay appeared in the "Edinburgh Review," we are not aware that it has been carefully examined by any leading periodical in this country. The sterling merit of most of Mr. Macaulay's productions is a sufficient reason for noticing at any time whatever comes from his pen; while the subject of this essay is so profoundly interesting to the theologian, the historian, and the philosophical inquirer, that whatever pretends to throw increased light upon it deserves, and should receive, attentive examination. Questions of a theological nature are unquestionably among the most difficult that the human mind can propose to itself for solution. None certainly require so delicate a handling, whether we regard them in relation to the prejudices with which their consideration necessarily comes in contact, or in relation to the high deductions which such questions involve. We see no reason why theological speculations should not have as solid a basis as speculations concerning any department of secular knowledge. We know that there is a cant which associates such speculations with the vagueness and mysticism of the scholastic metaphysicians; yet we know that few of those who use this cant have ever been strikingly distinguished for profundity of thought in any branch of knowledge which cannot be treated otherwise than deductively. Every psychologist knows that the key to progress in the science of mind consists in the careful and methodical study of one's own thinking. Every logician knows that no amount of knowledge of the forms of logic will be available to one who does not investigate for himself the premises on which the canons of logic are founded, because such

knowledge is absolutely requisite to make logic of any use when it is applied to the various arguments which, in disputation, are required to be thrown into logical formulæ. Therefore, the psychologist alone who has carefully performed those actions, the methodical arrangement of which constitutes the science of mind, is competent to analyze the complex phenomena belonging to the whole circle of the moral sciences. And that logician alone whose studies embrace the construction and reconstruction of logical science is a competent exponent of the various elements which that science includes. Any amount of psychological or logical knowledge otherwise acquired is of little other use to the student than the miscellaneous scraps of an ordinary newspaper to the indefatigable memorist who stores them in his mind without connection or use. When we come to the analysis of theological questions, the importance of cautious examination is highly augmented, for, in addition to the methodical pursuit of our inquiries, we are forced to control and direct the intensest *feelings* of which the human heart is susceptible. Neither Natural Theology nor Revealed Religion represents anything that is tangible. Our knowledge of Revealed Religion rests on *Testimony*.

Natural theology includes all those evidences of design which we have deduced in the physical, mental, and moral world relative to a Supreme Intelligence. It is plain, then, that in acquiring knowledge concerning either, all the higher processes of thought, the most refined deductions of the human mind, come into requisition. It is also evident that Theology cannot exhibit a more exact scientific basis than those branches of knowledge which involve analogous deductions, such as psychology and its collateral branches, because the deductions which such subjects involve are assumed to exist prior to any theological investigation. Therefore, the psychologist who has fundamentally examined his own thinking, who has methodized his deductions, and extended these deductions carefully to those intricate questions whose sum is Theology, is alone competent to extend the boundaries of theological knowledge.

Theological speculations have, it must be admitted, been comparatively barren of sound results. But, the theologian may retort, so have those branches of knowledge with which such speculations have been inseparably associated. Whatever course of thinking will tend to improve the one will tend, to the same extent, to improve the other, because each branch requires the same

method of reasoning, and involves nearly identical deductions. In proportion as psychological science advances, and the laws of a higher logic than that of syllogisms are evolved and matured, theological speculations will perceptibly approximate towards a highly accurate logical standard.

Dearth of progress can never be a sequence of the methodical pursuit of any branch of knowledge. He that proceeds to a great work with scarcely any definite object, with no definite and carefully wrought materials, will never realize any desirable result. If obscurity is associated with the first link in a chain of reasoning, it will augment with every consecutive link in the chain, and the result will involve obscurity accumulated in geometrical progression. The close sifting of premises, the analysis of terms, always indispensable in every argument, never appear so important as when applied to theological subjects. To no questions does the language of Bacon so strikingly apply, where he likens the vague and inaccurate use of language, by the unwary controversialist, to the bounding back of the Tartar's bow, so mightily does it entangle and pervert the judgment.

We think it will not escape the notice of the discerning reader that most of those points in relation to which we are compelled to differ from Mr. Macaulay involve the vague and inaccurate use of language. By analyzing the terms of the propositions which he has presented as the basis of his reasoning, the fallacy of all his arguments and illustrations will, we think, be clearly seen.

When he undertook to analyze the complex phenomena which the elements of the religious world present to every reflecting mind, he either mistook his powers, or he forgot that such subjects require reasoning different from that which is usually required in relation to those subjects on which he has written so ably and delightfully.

Mr. Macaulay eminently combines the highest characteristics of the best writers. He is as much celebrated for the matter of his productions as for the elegant style in which they are written. His style includes not so much any one distinctive excellence as a combination of most of the excellences of the purest writers of the English language. A style so close, so methodical, and so accurate should indicate a close, methodical, and accurate thinker. A fallacy, associated with much that is true, when set off with the

attractions which the style of such a writer exhibits, not unfrequently escapes detection, merely because of our reluctance to perceive it.

Though Mr. Macaulay rarely sacrifices the matter of his essays to graceful composition, we think his essay on the subject of Ranke's work will be regarded more as a favorable specimen of fine composition than as an elucidation of the problem he has attempted to solve. We do not find in it those rigid deductions, those weighty observations, and that cogent logic which so abundantly characterize his reviews and other essays. The essay, for convenience, may be divided into two portions: The historical portion of the essay, like most of Mr. Macaulay's historical essays, is presented in a style singularly lucid and splendid, and casting aside a few wrong deductions, which it would appear like affectation to point out where we have not the means to refute them, it may be regarded as a correct though brief development of the most striking events which have convulsed Catholic Christendom, and brought about those elements of opposition now generalized under the term *Protestantism*. The preliminary paragraphs which are designed to introduce this historical portion embody the attempt to prove that natural theology and revealed religion are not progressive sciences, and that therefore the reasoning which deduces the ultimate downfall of the Church of Rome from the progress of knowledge is founded on an entire mistake. The reasoning by which Mr. Macaulay endeavors to establish this position it is our purpose to examine. We think that the reader will agree with us that almost all the analogies which Mr. Macaulay has adduced to show that natural theology and revealed religion are not progressive sciences, are not only inconclusive, but inapplicable to the purpose for which they have been employed.

"There is not," says Mr. Macaulay, "and there never was, on this earth, a work of human policy so well deserving examination as the Roman Catholic Church."

The passage from which this is taken is exceedingly fine, but, like many other fine passages, the effect of its rhetoric is vitiated by its unsound logic. Such passages tingle upon the ear, and are the especial delight of fifth-rate thinkers. Mr. Macaulay assumes the Church of Rome to be a work of *human* policy. The term Church is vaguely used, but in no one of its varied applications will Mr. Macaulay's reasoning prove to be correct. If the term be applied to the ecclesiastical organization of the Church of Rome to distinguish it from other ecclesiastical organizations, then may the Church of Rome be

considered a work of human policy. But Mr. Macaulay's reasoning and illustrations would not apply to this restricted application of the term. The ecclesiastical organization of the Roman Catholic Church is but an integral, though a very important, part of the church. If the term be applied to include those fundamental doctrines of Christianity which are held in common by the Church of Rome and by all orthodox Protestant churches, the Church of Rome cannot be spoken of as wholly a work of human policy, because to the precise extent that she embodies scriptural truths does she exhibit the result of Divine policy. Plainly, then, if the Roman Catholic Church be solely a work of human policy, Mr. Macaulay has drawn conclusions favorable to that church not recognized in the premises, because he attributes to a work of human policy the results of the operation of those living truths which have, and which ever will have, an energy in themselves deeply to affect the human mind. But, if the term Church be used in its generic sense, so as to include as well some of the doctrines of Christianity as the ecclesiastical organization of the Roman Catholic Church, Mr. Macaulay's splendid illustrations relative to the antiquity of the church lose most of their force, unless they be assumed to refer to the antiquity of the truths which the Church of Rome embodies. The distinction is a very important one, and Protestant writers have rarely borne it in mind. In the early age of the Christian era, the doctrines of Christianity were associated with a peculiar ecclesiastical organization. This early organization under a combination of moral and political causes, has been extended into the present organization of the Roman Catholic Church. This has always appeared to us the one great secret of the extraordinary perpetuity of that church. A profound governmental scheme has been indissolubly associated with a theological scheme that bears the impress of Divinity. Both of these elements have been interwoven with forms and ceremonies which highly impress the senses and lead the imaginations of common minds captive. With this ceremonial paraphernalia, so irresistible to the unthinking mind, were bound up awful mysteries, which highly augmented the impressiveness of the ritual by which the devotee is influenced. In time all these various elements became popularly blended under that vague embodiment, the *Church*. It will thus be seen that there is not one element of power which the Catholic church has not made subservient to the government of the human mind. But one more element was required, not only to give coher-

ence and practical vigor to this vast system, but to give it a stability which it could not else enjoy. A system like this could not help coming in contact with antagonistic elements, which the ceaseless activity of the human mind was ever producing; and to evade these adverse elements, or to modify them, or at least to secure immunity itself from their modifying tendency, some bulwark was necessary to preserve its integrity. What was that bulwark? It cannot be expected that the keen-sighted statesmen of the Catholic Church could be blind to a power which all the social and political systems of humanity developed in so high a degree. By no means. These statesmen took hold of this principle, methodized it, and applied it to the government of large and varied masses of men with an ability that has never been surpassed—no, not even by the priesthood whose terrible theology is recorded in mysterious hieroglyphics upon the time-honored monuments of ancient Egypt. That principle is *Authority*. This is the corner-stone in the temple of Catholicism. It is the keystone in the arch of ecclesiastical despotism. Remove it, and the building crumbles in ruins—not the truths which the system may embrace certainly, for these are the inheritance of every people and of all time; but these truths will be absorbed by a system more congenial to the human mind in its progress towards the perfection of thought, feeling, and action. If these views be correct, the Church of Rome—that tremendous intermixture of truth and error, that imposing ramification of Christianity and paganism, that singular blending of democracy and despotism—will, to use a homely but significant phrase, *die out*. It will either sink into oblivion for want of that sustaining energy so essential to an operative system of faith, or it will be insensibly overwhelmed by a system which will absorb all the elements of strength that a religious people can furnish.

But our business now is with Mr. Macaulay. "We often hear it said," says Mr. Macaulay, "that the world is becoming more enlightened, and that this enlightening must be favorable to Protestantism and unfavorable to Catholicism. We wish that we could think so. But we see great reason to doubt whether this be a well-founded expectation. We see that, during the last two hundred and fifty years, the human mind has been in the highest degree active—that it has made great advances in every branch of natural philosophy—that it has made innumerable inventions tending to promote the conveniences of life—that medicine, surgery, engineering

have been very greatly improved—that police, government, and law have been improved, though not quite to the same extent. Yet we see that, during these two hundred and fifty years, Protestantism has made no conquests worth speaking of. Nay, we believe that, as far as there has been a change, that change has been in favor of the Church of Rome. We cannot, therefore, feel confident that the progress of knowledge will necessarily be fatal to a system which has, to say the least, stood its ground in spite of the immense progress which knowledge has made since the days of Queen Elizabeth."

Though it be granted that Protestantism has made no advancement worth speaking of since the days of Queen Elizabeth, we cannot admit that Mr. Macaulay's reasoning in this quotation has any relation whatever to the question really at issue. The activity of the human mind concerning the departments of knowledge to which he has referred will never evolve a truth on theological questions; and inasmuch as this is not the case, his allusions are neither pertinent nor conclusive. The enlightening which is assumed to be favorable to Protestantism, and adverse to Catholicism, requires other elements than those that are involved in the improvement of government and law, and of those branches of knowledge which are included within the domain of physical science. It is true that the cultivation of these subjects may exert a *collateral* influence in advancing a theological system by generating a state of mind favorable for discrimination. But in no other way. Nevertheless, is it a fact that Protestantism has not progressed since the days of Queen Elizabeth? We believe it is not a fact: the reverse is the truth. England is far more decidedly Protestant now than it was in Queen Elizabeth's time. France is far less decidedly Catholic now than it was at that period. There is not a nation on the Continent of Europe which has not exhibited a change adverse to the hierarchical pretensions of the Roman Catholic Church. That freedom and independence of thinking, which are the characteristic elements of Protestantism, have exerted a modifying influence upon all the institutions of every nation of Catholic Christendom. Let us bear in mind several facts. The popes of Queen Elizabeth's days exerted a weighty influence on the policy of all the cabinets of every Catholic nation on the Continent of Europe. Not even the hereditary right, the military genius, the consummate policy of Henry IV. of France could avail in securing a throne against that power of which the Pope of Rome was the natural head. Since then a genius of that same France has

trampled upon the immunities of the pontiff, has hurled defiance at his authority, has desecrated his holy city, has suspended the functions of his high office, and banished him from the scene of his labors to end his days in mournful captivity. And Pius VII. was enabled to exercise his legitimate functions only through the dominance of the powerful Anti-Catholic nations of the north. This is a fact pregnant with meaning. The Jesuits, at the time of Pius IV., were in the full tide of successful operation. Their indefatigable energy overcame every obstacle thrown in their way. Their restless activity is even now scarcely credible. In Asia, in Africa, in America, wherever the maritime discoveries of the age had offered them facilities for establishing missions, were the bold-hearted sons of Loyola to be found, planting the standard of the cross. Their machinations, their intrigues, their abominable policy infected every court of Europe. Their colleges and seminaries, filled with students, were established in nearly every city of Europe, whence they were ceaselessly sending forth enthusiastic sons of the church for the work of consolidating and extending the dominion of the Church of Rome. Their Machiavellian policy grossly tainted the Church. A powerful reaction came. Their order was suppressed, and the vigor with which their policy was assailed, and the church for which that policy was chiefly exerted, only proved the powerful antagonistic elements which such a system will ever encounter. The Church of Rome never employs power without abusing it; it never abuses it without creating a contrariety of impulse which threatens to destroy its sway, and dissolve its unity. These adverse tendencies have become so powerful of late years that the illusion respecting her perpetuity and the dominance of the church has little or no practical influence upon the great proportion of mankind. One thing is certain. Protestant nations, since the days of Queen Elizabeth, have held their own. Catholic nations have been torn by dissensions, and agitated by intestine commotions bearing against the Church of Rome; and in those nations has been generated a widely-extended philosophical skepticism—far more antagonistic to Romanism than to Protestantism—from which most Protestant nations have been comparatively exempt. In Protestant nations extensive changes have taken place, but none of these changes have tended in the slightest degree to retard the progress of Protestantism.

Violent changes are ever followed by powerful reactions. The

reaction in favor of Catholicism against the mighty movements of the Reformers, it must be recollected, were not consummated till nearly thirty years after Elizabeth's death. The great causes of this reaction were, as Mr. Macaulay says, the renovation of the church, the reformation of the orders, and the founding of the Society of Jesus.

Besides, the Church of Rome possessed what Ranke significantly calls the "habit of obedience and the externals of the past." The operation of these elements, apart from other causes, would naturally create a revulsion in favor of the church, when the novelty of the reformed doctrines had lost somewhat of its dazzling effect. At least such has always been the law which has governed every mighty revolution that has stirred the depths of the human heart in society. Now the reaction in favor of the Church of Rome was pushed too far, and it developed more powerful antagonistic elements than any against which the Church had contended. The eighteenth century presents an overwhelming reaction against that principle which the Jesuits so enthusiastically proclaimed; and though Protestantism cannot be said to have realized much from this reaction—that is, if we limit the application of the term Protestantism to a positive system of faith—yet, inasmuch as the distinctive principle of the philosophical school is identical with the distinctive characteristic of Protestantism, it may be regarded as a collateral element favorable to the advancement of Protestantism. Whatever weakens Catholicism relatively strengthens Protestantism. The Church of Rome has never regained that power over mankind which she enjoyed previously to the mighty assaults of the Philosophical school against her prerogatives. The fact that France—that hotbed of Romanism in the time of Louis XIV.—does not now recognize exclusively any particular system of faith is a proof that powerful changes have taken place in a country where Catholicism was once so decidedly dominant. The political tendencies of the age are unfavorable to any hierarchical system. The law of the world is progress. Government is admitted by all intelligent men to be an experimental science. Therefore, inasmuch as religion is inseparably blended with all the political and social institutions of the world, we may rationally infer that it will exhibit a higher development coetaneous with the progress of these social and political institutions. The course of thinking that will suggest the improvement of these social and political institutions will equally suggest a corresponding improvement of the religious

systems among men. That is, this course of thinking will suggest to the enlightened religionist the necessity of resolving these systems into the highest forms which they may possibly be made to assume. If this be so, it is only necessary to assume its indefinite extension to be able to assert confidently, that every religious system will approximate to a correct standard till all are resolved into a harmonious one. This would be a moral, intellectual, and religious Millennium indeed.

But Mr. Macaulay's reasoning leads to a very different result. It may be compressed into these two propositions: Natural theology and revealed religion are not progressive sciences; therefore the progress of knowledge cannot be assumed to be unfavorable to Romanism. Now, whether natural theology and revealed religion be progressive sciences or not, does not concern the question whether the progress of knowledge will be favorable or unfavorable to Romanism. We affirm, and trust that we shall prove, that natural theology is a progressive science. That revealed religion, in the strict sense in which Mr. Macaulay uses the term, is not a progressive science, is true; but to assume that, because revealed religion is not a progressive science, the progress of knowledge, or the enlightening of mankind, will not be unfavorable to Romanism, is quite another question. The truth of this conclusion depends altogether upon the question what elements Romanism may embody that are not strictly derived from Scripture, and yet are likely to be influenced, either favorably or adversely, by the progress of knowledge. A false religion may include elements which the enlightening of the world may dissipate, even though nothing should be added to the stock of revealed truth. Suppose that many of the characteristics of Romanism are not based upon Scripture. If they are not so based, they form a part of knowledge with which the progressiveness or non-progressiveness of revealed religion has nothing to do. Causes independent of Divine truth having occasioned these peculiarities, why should not causes independent of Divine truth assist in their correction? What is Romanism? All Protestants agree that it includes many elements not contained in the Scriptures, and that even those fundamental doctrines of Scripture which it embodies are more or less perverted. If this be so, why should the non-progressiveness of revealed religion be assumed as a reason why Romanism will not be adversely affected by the progress of knowledge? Such an assumption is grossly

absurd, because perpetuity would thus be affirmed of a system based on premises with which Scripture has nothing to do. As a proof of our correctness, we will refer to one significant fact. The fundamental distinction between Protestantism and Catholicism does not consist in a difference of doctrine, though in this respect the divergence is irreconcilable. It is this: The characteristic element of Protestantism is *Private Interpretation*; that of Catholicism is *Church Authority*. These elements are antagonistic. If we embrace the one, we must abandon the other. Not only is this a peculiarity that contradistinguishes Catholicism from Protestantism, but, mark, it is a peculiarity which no appeal to the Bible can ever solve. Let it be granted that revealed truth should progress; still, so long as men cannot agree concerning the right and authority of interpretation, disputes would be interminable, and the progressiveness of revealed truth would leave such differences precisely where it found them. We will refer to one fact as an *experimentum crucis*. Mr. Macaulay has assumed, from the very nature of his argument, the truth of the Old and New Testament Scriptures. There was a time when revealed religion was certainly progressive. Revealed religion is contained in certain books. All of these books were not written at the same time. Yet the New Testament Scriptures did not reconcile the Pharisees and Sadducees. Both sects rejected Christianity; and the Jews remain, at the present time, as distinct a class as when, in the time of Christ, they were contradistinguished from Gentiles. Now, if revealed religion was not unfavorable to the Jews when it was unquestionably progressive, we certainly have no reason to infer that the progress of revealed religion, at the present time, would be any more favorable to Catholicism. Why? Because, if men cannot agree concerning what the Scripture teaches, the progress of revealed religion cannot possibly reconcile their differences.

"Indeed," continues Mr. Macaulay, "the argument we are considering appears to us to be founded on an entire mistake. There are branches of knowledge with respect to which the law of the human mind is progress. In mathematics, when once a proposition is demonstrated, it is never afterwards contested."

This reasoning detracts from the merits of that brilliant writer, and exhibits a vagueness somewhat remarkable in one so strikingly distinguished for closeness and precision. We opine that when any proposition is demonstrated, it is never afterwards contested. Only prove a proposition to be demonstrated, whether in relation to morals

or theology, and it will be as incontestable as any proposition in mathematics. We assume, of course, that the reasoning relative to each proposition is understood. The great desideratum is simply to induce men to agree concerning the fact of a demonstration. Unfortunately, this desideratum exists as well in relation to some of the purely experimental sciences as in relation to theology. What Mr. Macaulay means, doubtless, is that mathematical science is in a state so akin to perfection that no two persons ever think of holding a dispute concerning the accuracy of a given proposition. But a *demonstrated* proposition is the same, whether applied to natural theology or mathematics.

"There is no chance," says he, "that either in the purely demonstrative, or in the purely experimental sciences, the world will go back or even remain stationary."

It makes no difference, in relation to the present argument, whether or not it does either.

"But with theology," he tells us, "the case is different. As respects natural religion, it is not easy to see that a philosopher of the present day is more favorably situated than Thales or Simonides. He has before him just the same evidences of design the early Greeks had. We say just the same, for the discoveries of modern astronomers have added really nothing to the force of the argument which a reflecting mind finds in every beast, bird, insect, fish, leaf, flower, and shell."

This reasoning proves nothing at all. It is unworthy of Mr. Macaulay. It includes a fallacy which cannot easily be perceived by an incautious reader. He does not tell us whom he means by a "reflecting mind"—whether an early Greek, or a modern natural theologian. He does not tell us whether he refers to what was known of the bird, insect, and fish by the early Greek, or what is known of them by the modern student of natural theology. If he refers to the modern, his illustration is worthless, for the question stands precisely where it stood before. Even in this respect, we think, the question disputable, because any information we derive in relation to the nature of anything we examine adds to the force of an argument which is postulated on the design exhibited in its construction. But, if Mr. Macaulay refers to the early Greek, he is drawing a conclusion favorable to the ancients from the experience of a modern reflecting mind, which is assuming the proposition to be proved.

If we take the literal meaning of Mr. Macaulay's sentence, that *we*—the moderns—possess the same evidences of design the early Greeks possessed, the truism requires no comment. But if the reverse be implied, not only is the statement grossly absurd, but it depreciates the importance of that refined study which seeks to find God in the universe—a branch of knowledge rich in materials of reflection to the poet, the philosopher, and the humble lover of whatever suggests the wisdom and beneficence of an All-wise Being.

The construction of our solar system—all those wonderful discoveries which modern philosophers have made in every department of natural science, in which the indications of design are so ample and so striking, were wholly unknown to the early Greeks. In neither of the senses in which the word *same* can be applied will Mr. Macaulay's reasoning prove correct. He evidently means that the argument drawn from the objects of contemplation in the natural world, whether by an early Greek, or by the modern natural theologian, is identical. But it would not follow that the argument of the one would not embrace more elements than that of the other. The argument would be the same in kind, but, inasmuch as the one includes a more extensive induction than the other, it would involve the progress of the science of natural theology. What is meant by an evidence of design? Undoubtedly an indication of intelligence we have deduced from comparing any given result with the means employed to accomplish it. Now, Mr. Macaulay's hypothesis would be sufficiently refuted by showing any construction in nature in which intelligence is indicated, of which the early Greek was ignorant; in other words, by showing that the early Greeks did not possess the *aggregate* evidences of design we possess. But his argument deserves further examination.

The basis whence we have inferred design has been the result, in many instances, of the induction of centuries. In astronomy, especially, this is true. Many anomalies have been thought to exist in nature which extended investigations of natural philosophers have explained. Many doubts as to the wisdom and beneficence exhibited in a given construction, which have occupied the minds of the wisest of mankind, have been dispelled by the results of further investigation, as the field of analogy has been extended. Mr. Macaulay says, "Nothing adds to the force of that argument

which a reflecting mind finds in every fish, leaf, and shell." In what does the argument consist, let us first ascertain, and then we may more easily see whether or not any thing adds to its force. Whence is the argument drawn? In an insect or flower we observe indications of design, from which we infer the existence of an Intelligence. If the basis of our deductions is the design exhibited in its construction, it is evident that our conclusions relative to the existence of a Designer will be forcible in proportion as these are multiplied and clearly appreciated. The natural theologian examines an insect. He observes the nice adaptation of its parts to perform a given function. He perceives an organization admirably according with the instincts it exhibits, and indispensably necessary to maintain its existence. He who is best acquainted with the anatomy and physiology of this insect, and the relations of these to its instincts, is unquestionably most competent to infer design. It cannot be assumed that the early Greeks understood entomology, or any branch of knowledge applied to natural theology, as well as the modern natural theologian. The early Greeks could only reflect upon an insect as they had a basis for reflection. This basis must be composed of a knowledge of its habits and instincts. Now the strength of the inference in favor of a Designer must be in exact proportion to the appreciation of these habits and instincts. How can they be appreciated if not known? How can they be supposed known by those who had not the means to acquire information concerning them? That the early Greek had only very partial means to acquire this information, it would be altogether superfluous to prove. It is, then, clearly evident that natural theology is a progressive science, and that it has advanced since the time of the early Greek. The Aggregate Evidences of Design exhibited in the natural world constitute natural theology a science, and just in proportion as these are multiplied does the science progress. It does not progress in the same manner that the mathematical sciences progress. But neither in this sense do jurisprudence and political economy progress.

The term *science* has several meanings. In one of its meanings it represents any given branch of knowledge *systematized*. In another of its meanings, it represents any branch of knowledge which is clearly contradistinguished from another branch. In the first instance, the science may be said to advance according as the elements it embraces are more and more *methodically* presented. In

the second, the science advances in proportion as new facts are added to an aggregate already assumed to exist. In the latter sense is natural theology a science. In the other sense, neither natural religion nor revealed religion is a science at all.

"As to the other great question"—says Mr. Macaulay—"the question what becomes of man after death—we do not see that a highly educated European, left to his unassisted reason, is more likely to be in the right than a Blackfoot Indian. Not a single one of the many sciences in which we surpass the Blackfoot Indian throws the smallest light on the state of the soul after the animal life is extinct. In truth, all the philosophers, ancient and modern, who have attempted, without the help of Revelation, to prove the immortality of man, from Plato down to Franklin, appear to us to have failed deplorably."

Whether the immortality of the soul can be demonstrated independently of Revelation it is not our purpose to inquire. And indeed it would be useless to offer any proof on the subject, considering that Mr. Macaulay has offered none negatively or affirmatively. Nevertheless, we consider his reasoning, if such it may be called, extremely unsound. We are not quite certain that Christianity may not be necessary to originate those conditions which are essential to form a highly educated European. If such an educated being is not more likely to be in the right than a Blackfoot Indian, what is the reason that no Blackfoot Indian—what is the reason that no people whose intellectual cultivation is not beyond that of the Blackfoot Indian—has approximated so nigh that standard which is considered infallible? Not only did Plato place the immortality of the soul upon a rational basis, but the fundamental principle which he put forth is in many respects identical with that recognized by Christianity. Christianity brought life and "immortality" to *light*. It gave form, and distinctness, and positiveness to the sentiment which has, under a variety of manifestations, influenced, to a greater or less extent, all thinking minds in all ages of the world. The immortality of the soul is a deduction of the human mind. Now, he who is best acquainted with deductive reasoning—he who has most carefully examined the premises on which his deductions are based, will be most likely to draw accurate conclusions on any subject in which they are involved. Scarcely any but the most refined minds are capable of comprehending the exceedingly complex relations which the examination of this

subject involves. Consequently, the great proportion of mankind have been taught what they are said to know on the subject authoritatively. It appears to us to be the height of absurdity to assume that a Blackfoot Indian—in whom what Coleridge calls the “inner sense” is not born—is as likely to be in the right concerning so refined a question as the highly educated European who has, to the best of his ability, investigated the relations on which the truth of the doctrine is postulated. Unless we assume that a Blackfoot Indian is as conversant with the legitimate premises whence these deductions are drawn, the likelihood of his being as much in the right concerning the immortality of the soul is as little probable as his likelihood of his being as much in the right on any other subject which involves purely deductive reasoning.

A great portion of the truths of astronomy, in fact, of every branch of physical science, are as clearly deductive as the reasoning by which we attempt to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. To be sure, in the one case we have physical data upon which our deductions are based. But the doctrine of the soul's immortality is so purely deductive that no basis of a tangible nature can be assumed. The course of thinking by which we proceed from the known to the unknown relative to the laws of our being is identical with that employed in every branch of knowledge in which deductive reasoning can be made available.

The inference from this is obvious. That man, or that nation which has most cultivated deductive reasoning is most likely to understand and appreciate the objects its study embraces. If it be proved that uncivilized nations cultivate deductive reasoning with as much ability as a nation celebrated for its civilization and refinement, the chances of coming to correct conclusions on such doctrines as that of the immortality of the soul are of course equal. What so pre-eminently distinguishes a refined from an unenlightened nation as the difference of degree in which this intellectual process is respectively understood? Familiarity with this process would include the ability to apply it to every branch of knowledge—to jurisprudence, to government, to political economy. But its application to these subjects would indicate an advanced state of civilization. Therefore, if uncivilized nations have yet scarcely understood the alphabet of deductive reasoning in relation to those subjects with which it is generally and most likely to be associated, we have

certainly no reason to infer that the views which they entertain on a subject which involves still higher deductions are likely to be any more profound and ingenious. If travellers have not misled us with respect to the views and habits of thinking among barbarous and uncivilized nations, we should be forced to conclude that purely deductive reasoning scarcely exists among them, much less made an object of specific cultivation.

“Then again,” he continues, “all the great enigmas which perplex the natural theologian are the same in all ages. The ingenuity of a people just emerging from barbarism is quite sufficient to propound them. The wisdom of Locke or Clarke is quite unable to solve them.”

If Mr. Macaulay had told us what these enigmas are, though he should not have told us what is necessary to constitute their solution, his argument would have been more to the purpose, if it would not have been more sound.

Enigmas identical with those which perplex the natural theologian meet the inquiring mind in every branch of science; and if anything relative either to our present or future happiness was postulated upon them, their perplexity would appear augmented. In tracing effects to causes, we arrive at a point beyond which we cannot go—in other words, we arrive at a cause which we denominate final. If we call this an enigma, then we may truly say that these enigmas are the same in every branch of knowledge—that is, as far as our ability to solve them is concerned. But such reasoning as this is puerile.

“It is a mistake,” Mr. Macaulay says, “to imagine that subtle speculations touching the Divine attributes, the origin of evil, the necessity of human actions, the foundation of moral obligation, imply any high degree of intellectual culture. Such speculations, on the contrary, are in a peculiar manner the delight of intelligent children and of half-civilized men.”

In a very peculiar manner, we think. It depends altogether upon the question what these speculations embrace whether or not they imply a high degree of intellectual culture. If they embrace the attempt to solve ultimate causes, the energy expended in their attempted solution will be productive of no useful result, whether the investigator be cultivated or illiterate, because such an attempt betokens a gross ignorance of what is the scope and boundary of our investigations. So long as there are Divine attributes, so long

as evil exists, so long as actions are considered necessitated or voluntary, so long as mankind is subject to moral obligations,—so long may speculations concerning them—the more so as they are subtle—betoken high intellectual culture as truly as speculations concerning government and political economy. Investigators in either department are necessitated to draw conclusions from given premises; and though the subjects of investigation may be included in distinct categories, there is no more reason why one inquirer should fail than the other, provided each is cautious in sifting his premises and weighing his deductions. Each inquirer, if he chooses, may easily get beyond his tether. There is no necessity that either should go beyond it. The fact is, we cannot be said to speak correctly concerning any subject which involves reasoning unless that subject is approximately capable of elucidation. If metaphysicians and moral philosophers have failed in explaining such subjects, their failure is owing to the incorrect methods which they have applied to their solution—not to the peculiarity in the nature of the things themselves. Inasmuch as they represent deductions of the human mind, the process of thinking from which they have been evolved can be traced and correctly presented.

"The number of boys is not small," he continues, "who, at fourteen, have thought enough on these questions to be fully entitled to the praise which Voltaire gives to Zadig, 'Il en savait ce qu'on en a su dans tous les âges, c'est-à-dire, fort peu de chose.'" (He knows as much about it as any one else has ever known, that is to say, scarcely anything at all.)

Mr. Macaulay never made a greater mistake. The fallacy of the illustration is so striking that we cannot think it would for a moment have imposed upon his mind had it been employed against him by an antagonist. The word *know*, like knowledge, is a generic term. It is consequently liable to be vaguely used. If by the word "know" Mr. Macaulay intends to represent the certainty we are conscious of when we declare that we have seen a familiar face; or when we declare that the sun is risen; or when we declare that the wind blows—then he has assuredly proved his point. But the subjects to which he has referred are not *known* in this way. Men know nothing, in this strict sense of the term, relative to a Supreme Intelligence. They merely *infer* something, and in proportion to the strength of the premises upon which these inferences are founded may they be said *approximately* to know.

Arguments employed with reference to the existence of a Supreme Being merely embody these inferences. But in the only sense in which we can apply the term *know* relative to the Divine attributes and to the origin of evil, "boys of fourteen" know little or nothing concerning them. They may be taught, we grant, *which* are the Divine attributes, but we will venture to assert that not one in a thousand of the most intelligent boys of fourteen knows *what* a Divine attribute means, whence this attribute is deduced, and why it is predicated of God. Such subjects are beyond the range of their knowledge. Their minds are not sufficiently developed to enable them to discriminate relations of which that constitutes only a part. But Mr. Macaulay has assumed still more—that they are not only capable of comprehending the reasoning applicable to such questions, but that they are capable of drawing conclusions in relation to them equal in profundity to those of the highest class of philosophers that ever lived. We do not see why the capacity to reflect so profoundly on these subjects should not include the capacity to reflect as profoundly on other subjects which have occupied the attention of the wise men of the world. They ought thus to be equal to a Locke, to a Kant, or to a Coleridge. If they so well understand these questions, why has no boy of fourteen ever given a dissertation which has impressed the thinking world, and served to change, to form, or to modify impressions long existing? An answer to that question would reduce the argument to a nutshell.

"Natural theology, then," says Mr. Macaulay, "is not a progressive science." Whether it be or be not a progressive science, Mr. Macaulay has certainly failed to show that it is not a progressive science.

With respect to revealed religion, we have previously admitted that it is not a progressive science in the strict sense in which he has employed the term. Nevertheless, though we admit his premise, we are forced to dissent from his conclusions. The illustrations which he has brought to bear upon his attempted demonstration are inapposite, his analogies are irrelative, and his reasoning is unsound.

"All divine truth is," he says, "according to the doctrine of the Protestant churches, recorded in certain books. It is equally open to all who in any age can read those books; nor can all the discoveries of all the philosophers in the world add a single verse to any of these books. It is plain, therefore, that in divinity there cannot be a progress analogous to that which is constantly taking place in pharmacy and navigation."

Here we have another sample of that meager analogical reasoning to which we have before adverted. Why does Mr. Macaulay always adduce, in illustration of these subjects, such sciences as pharmacy, geology, and navigation? Every one of these concerns tangibilities. Mr. Macaulay would scarcely contend that ethics is not a progressive sciences. We think that he would even admit that Sir James Mackintosh has advanced, to some extent at least, that science. But it is plain that, on such subjects, there cannot take place a progress analogous to that which is constantly taking place in pharmacy, geology, and navigation. Such a progress has not taken place. Though it be granted that all Divine truth is recorded in certain books, and that nothing will ever be added to those books, yet Mr. Macaulay's argument is worthless because no addition to those books could possibly be fatal to a system which, according to Mr. Macaulay's own showing, is unaffected by the truths which are already assumed to be contained in them. If Catholicism be a false system, as he admits, and if it maintains its present exalted position in spite of its antagonism to revealed truth, it is absurd to suppose that any accession of elements to the stock of revealed truth will impair its integrity. We see no reason why its prosperity would be affected any more by what is added to than by what now belongs to the canon of Scripture, if divergence to either portion be assumed to exist in an equal degree. He says it seems to him that we have no security for the future against the prevalence of any theological error which has prevailed in time past among Christian men. Why? Because none of the discoveries and inventions of modern times—such as gunpowder, gas, and vaccination, which he strangely assumes to constitute the sum of knowledge—have the smallest bearing on the question whether man is justified by faith alone, or whether the invocation of saints is an orthodox practice. Any writer who would assume that the progress of any of these branches of knowledge is connected, except collaterally—and that in a very limited degree—with the progress or decline of theological truth, would obtain very little credit, indeed, for sagacity. But we would remark that one who has a pure love of scientific truth—one whose mind has been untrammelled by early associations and educational bias—would be likely to investigate theological questions with far more candor than one who has been taught from infancy that to examine these questions for himself is a grievous error. We think few thinking

minds will for a moment doubt that candor is a touchstone that would go far to reconcile many discordant sects. He says a Christian of the fifth century with a Bible is on a par with a Christian of the nineteenth century, candor and natural acuteness supposed equal. Granted—the illustration proves nothing at all. There is not that unanimity of opinion concerning what is contained in the Bible which exists in relation to pharmacy and navigation, and the thousand discoveries and inventions of modern times. To sum up the whole matter, the security in the future against the prevalence of any theological error would depend on an agreement among men on what is contained in the Scriptures, not on the addition of new truths to the stock of revealed religion, if the same discrepancy of opinion which now exists should still be assumed to exist in relation to the added truths.

What influence will the progress of knowledge exert as a collateral means in producing that cultivation of mind, that independence of thought without which theological and all analogous questions can neither be understood nor appreciated? This is the question we should ask ourselves when we wish to estimate the influence which the progress of knowledge would have upon a system equally contrary to reason and Scripture. If the progress of knowledge will have any influence in producing that thoughtful, unprejudiced state of mind which will induce a seeking of truth for its own sake wherever it may be found, and in whatever system it may be bound up, we may, from these conditions, deduce the eventual downfall of a radically false theological system as conclusively as we deduce from the same conditions the final triumph of truth and wisdom.

Mr. Macaulay says, he is confident that the world will never go back to the solar system of Ptolemy. Why? An answer to this question would suggest the answer to a question equally important—whether the world will ever go back to a system of religion less pure than the one we now hold. No fact is more evident than that Christianity exhibits a purer phase now than it exhibited during the Middle Ages. If we argue from the past relative to the future, we may unquestionably assume that Christianity will present a still higher development. The causes assumed to have produced these results in the past must equally be assumed to produce the same results in the future. If this be so, the world must thus gradually approximate towards perfection. Now the question is, Will the progress of science contribute to produce this result? We answer with

confidence, it will, either indirectly or collaterally. The progress of science involves continued cautious thinking. It necessitates the habit of thinking. This habit once formed, the steps are short which lead the inquiring mind to examine its own thinking. The mind is thus turned back on itself. The thinker then carefully traces the processes from which his thoughts are evolved. Every law which forms the groundwork of science, every deduction included in theology, psychology, or morals, he resolves into its proximate elements. Therefore, whatever is a result of thinking is embraced within his reflections. Now, inasmuch as the progress of knowledge tends to produce a habit of thinking, and inasmuch as thinking is limited to no one field—whether one's own mind, or the laws of the sciences—it follows that it may be extended to theological questions, and thus be the indirect means of advancing theology—that is, as far as a correct form of theology can be arrived at by the human mind. If our views be correct, the extension of scientific education to all classes of mankind will include an approximation, however slight, towards this result.

Mr. Macaulay says that Sir Thomas More was a man of eminent talents, and that inasmuch as no progress that science has made or will make can add to the force of what seems to him the overwhelming argument against the real presence, he is unable to understand why what Sir Thomas More believed respecting transubstantiation may not be believed to the end of time by men equal in abilities and honesty to Sir Thomas More. The inference is unjust. A fairer statement of the question would be: What opinion would an eminent man be most likely to form respecting the truth of this doctrine? A man of "eminent talents" is a vague expression. A man so profoundly acquainted with one branch of knowledge as to be entitled to the appellation may not have a schoolboy's knowledge, either in extent or accuracy, of subjects of equal or of far greater importance. If a man be presumed to grow up under associations of birth and education similar to those of Sir Thomas More, if his investigations are included within the same range, we expect he would become precisely such an eminent person as Sir Thomas More. But for what would he become eminent? Not certainly for profound views relative to those laws of thinking which govern our belief on theological questions and all questions of a purely deductive nature. In this field Sir Thomas More was not eminent. His fame, apart from his reputation for

integrity, depends on his acquaintance with very different elements of knowledge. He cannot be said to have been ready to die for the doctrine of transubstantiation, as Mr. Macaulay asserts,—but rather for that system of which transubstantiation is only a part.

With a choice specimen of human virtue like Sir Thomas More, Mr. Macaulay considers the doctrine of transubstantiation a kind of proof charge. "A faith," says he, "which stands that test will stand any test." Now, it should be recollected that transubstantiation is not presented, as a test of our faith, exclusively on its own merits. It is associated with a creed which is regarded by Roman Catholics with far more reverence than the Bible. It is considered a profound and incomprehensible mystery.

Therefore it would be very unwise to assume that Romanists analyze the doctrine with that vigorous closeness they would analyze any dogma not embodied in the Roman Catholic creed. Mr. Macaulay has erred in relation to this doctrine in the same way most Protestant writers have erred. Protestants may present the overwhelming argument against the real presence to the Catholic, and exhaust their powers of reasoning to drive it home to his mind. They may point out to him that it contradicts the evidence of our senses. They may show him that, by discarding that evidence, he destroys the basis whence all his knowledge is derived. They may show him that what contradicts the unequivocal testimony of sense is as inconsistent as to believe a contradiction in terms,—that it is as absurd as to believe a thing is, and is not, at the same point of time. They may explain to him that the only means we can possibly possess to test the truth of the doctrine are our senses; that from the exercise of these senses all our ideas are produced; that by the revolving of these ideas in our minds, we are able to possess thoughts—the one consecutively depending on the other: and that, by rejecting what these senses so positively, so unmistakably declare to us, we plainly assume that our knowing nothing—that is, by rejecting that basis by which alone we are enabled to know anything—is a postulate of our knowing something. But all your reasoning will most likely be only as sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. Your arguments will be as ineffectual in producing conviction upon his mind as the prayers of the prophets of Baal in evoking the assistance of their god.

This striking anomaly can only be explained upon this hypothesis: All that the Catholic believes concerning matters of faith he believes upon *Authority*. If authority to declare what we shall and

what we shall not believe be conceded as the undoubted prerogative of a priesthood, it is of no possible consequence to us what dogmas we believe, so long as these dogmas are enjoined by the authority which we have assumed to be our unerring guide. Authority first assumed, all the possible vagaries of belief logically follow. Whether we are required to believe transubstantiation or consubstantiation, neither of these can be appealed to as a test of faith, so long as that test of faith which enjoins them—that All-powerful authority—is left untouched. Unsettle a Romanist's mind respecting the authority of the Roman Catholic Church—induce him carefully to examine what that authority means, whence it is deduced, and why, and how far consistently it can be predicated of any class of men—induce him to examine these questions with all candor and honesty of heart, and then, if his faith stands *that* test, we may confidently assert it will stand any test.

"One reservation," says Mr. Macaulay, "must indeed be made. The books and traditions of a sect may contain, mingled with propositions strictly theological, other propositions purporting to rest on the same authority, which relate to physics. If new discoveries should throw discredit on the physical propositions, the theological propositions, unless they can be separated from the physical propositions, must share in their discredit. In this way undoubtedly the progress of science may indirectly serve the cause of religious truth. The Hindoo mythology, for example, is bound up with a most absurd geography. Every young Brahmin, therefore, who learns geography in our colleges learns to smile at the Hindoo mythology. If Catholicism has not suffered to an equal degree by the papal decision that the sun goes around the earth, this is because all intelligent Catholics now hold, with Pascal, that in deciding the point at all, the church exceeded her powers, and was therefore justly left destitute of that supernatural assistance which, in the exercise of her legitimate functions, the promise of her Founder authorized her to expect."

Now what does this "reservation" concern? Simply that the cause of religious truth may be indirectly served by the progress of science. Science, by exposing the absurd geography with which the Hindoo mythology is inseparably blended, leaves the way open—partially, it is true—to the legitimate operation of the truths of Christianity. But the fact must be assumed that the Hindoo believes a correct geography. If he should believe nothing that contravenes the Hindoo mythology, the illustration is of course worthless

But on what evidence does he believe that the geography which he has been taught is absurd? Assuredly, by the evidence of sense. If he trusted not this evidence, he would never learn to smile at the Hindoo mythology. Now, the geography of the Hindoos, and the transubstantiation of Romanists, belong, in this respect, to the same category. Therefore, Mr. Macaulay cannot logically exclude transubstantiation from the same reservation he makes in favor of the Hindoo mythology. But he does exclude it on the ground that revealed religion is not a progressive science. Now it is not the progress of revealed religion that he assumes to be unfavorable to Brahminism, but a correct geography, with which the progress of revealed religion has nothing to do. Therefore, on his own premises, what should exclude Romanism from those influences adverse to Brahminism, if the objection to each system embodies, except in degree, the same elements? In plain terms, if the progress of knowledge cannot be assumed to be unfavorable to one false theological system, even though that system should embody a dogma contrary to the evidence of sense, why, upon the same premises, should this progress be declared unfavorable to any other theological system, when the ground of this adverse influence is the fact that the system embraces elements contradicted by the senses? On Mr. Macaulay's hypothesis, we conceive this to be an inextricable dilemma. Physical testimony bears not more conclusively against the truth of the Hindoo geography than against that of transubstantiation. But, as far as this testimony tends to create an entire change of thinking, why is it so much more unfavorable to Brahminism than to Catholicism? Because transubstantiation is but a part of a vast theological scheme with which physical science has no concern.

Transubstantiation is associated with much that is acknowledged to be true by the great body of the Christian world, while the greater portion of the Catholic creed, which Protestants reject as absurd, has no relation to physics. The reason why Catholicism has not suffered as much by the papal decision that the sun goes round the earth, as the Brahmin mythology has suffered by the light of science, is not, as Mr. Macaulay asserts, because all intelligent Catholics now hold, with Pascal, that, in deciding the point at all, the church exceeded her powers; it is because Catholicism presents no such incongruous combination of mythological and geographical absurdities. Besides, papal decisions do not constitute

Catholicism; else the rejection of these decisions by intelligent Catholics would be, to that extent, the renunciation of Catholicism.

"This reservation," continues Mr. Macaulay, "affects not at all the truth of the proposition, that divinity, properly so called, is not a progressive science. A very common knowledge of history, a very little observation of life, will suffice to prove that no learning, no sagacity, affords a security against the greatest errors on subjects relating to the invisible world. Bayle and Chillingworth, two of the most skeptical of mankind, turned Catholics from sincere conviction. Johnson, incredulous on all other points, was a ready believer in miracles and apparitions. He would not believe in Ossian, but he believed in the second sight. He would not believe in the earthquake of Lisbon, but he believed in the Cock Lane ghost."

It is of little consequence whether this reservation affects or does not affect the truth of the proposition that divinity is not a progressive science. Mr. Macaulay has not advanced a single argument to prove that divinity, *properly so called*, is not a progressive science. The term divinity, correctly applied, is not synonymous with revealed truth, but it includes rather the *arrangement* or *classification* of the principles of revealed truth. But these principles represent deductions of the human mind. They are among the most complex and intricate of all deductions. Now he who assumes that these deductions have been accurately analyzed, and have been methodically presented by most theologians, in their published systems of divinity, has evidently paid little or no attention to this field of intellectual research. It could very easily be proved that if divinity, in this sense of the term, cannot progress, no branch of metaphysical science can possibly progress, for these branches of knowledge are far more intimately related than most writers appear to think. But if this reservation does not affect the truth of his proposition concerning divinity, it very materially affects the correctness of his reasoning concerning the progress of knowledge upon a false theological system, because the reasoning that would induce the Brahmin to examine the truth of the geography bound up with the mythology of his religion may induce the Catholic to examine the premises on which he is required to believe the doctrine of transubstantiation, and thus lead him to question the truth of a system which embodies such an element in its creed. No learning, no sagacity affords security against the greatest errors relating to the invisible world. But on what premises are we to know what are

errors relating to the invisible world? Not on Scripture certainly, for Scripture reveals nothing definite concerning it. But we cannot be cognizant of errors without being to the same extent cognizant of truths relative to that world. Now, if revelation teaches us nothing definite on the subject, and if no learning, no sagacity affords any security against errors relating to it, what is the standard by which opinions relative to the invisible world are declared to be erroneous or true? If Scripture is not that standard, our learning and sagacity must be that standard, for, independent of a natural and a supernatural, it can have no other basis. If our learning and sagacity constitute that basis, it is a contradiction in terms to say that learning and sagacity cannot decide what are errors and what are truths relative to the spiritual world,—that is, of course, if we speak of errors and truths concerning that world on any other hypothesis than that opinions which are irreconcilable with one another cannot all possibly be true. All that the Scripture teaches us concerning futurity is embodied in general terms. Happiness or misery, dependent on virtuous and vicious conduct in this world, sums up what has been revealed to us. Much that may be included in the term *fanaticism* may not be inconsistent either with the reward of the righteous, or with the punishment of the wicked; and yet we may declare what is fanatical, and what is not fanatical, upon premises as indisputable as any which can be produced to substantiate any axiom in political science. Bayle and Chillingworth, says Mr. Macaulay, two of the most skeptical of mankind, turned Catholics from sincere conviction. The illustration would have been more to the purpose if it had included a reference to their learning or sagacity. The question arises in our mind, skepticism relative to what things? Unless the term be used with reference to some specific conditions, it is without meaning. A man may doubt on one point, and believe on another point. He might, with reason, be skeptical concerning the Cock Lane ghost, and very reasonably believe in the earthquake of Lisbon. Jefferson and Paine were two of the most skeptical of men; so were Hobbes and Hume. Yet Jefferson and Paine abhorred, in their inmost hearts, a monarchical government. Hume and Hobbes, with equal sincerity, doubted the beneficial tendency of any other kind of government. Besides, Mr. Macaulay should have stated that, though Bayle and Chillingworth became Catholics in youth, neither was a Catholic in mature age. Chillingworth not only again became a Protestant, but he was

unquestionably the ablest defender of Protestantism that ever appeared. It is scarcely necessary to say that Bayle's system of free thinking was more antagonistic to Catholicism than to Protestantism. If Johnson had applied the same powers of mind to the investigation of the second sight, the Cock Lane ghost, and the earthquake of Lisbon, which he made to bear upon the investigation of the authenticity of Ossian, Mr. Macaulay's illustration would have been more to the purpose. With respect to Ossian, Johnson analyzed and doubted; the absurdities of the Cock Lane ghost and the second sight he believed, but did not analyze.

For these reasons Mr. Macaulay has ceased to wonder at any vagaries of superstition. But if they are reasons why he should cease to wonder, they are equally reasons why he should never have begun to wonder. The fact is, they are not reasons at all either why we should wonder, or why we should cease to wonder, at the vagaries of superstition, because they are not the premises on which alone we are enabled to decide whether any given notion is or is not superstitious. He has seen men, he says, not of mean talents, or neglected education, well-read scholars, expert logicians, keen observers of life and manners, prophesying, interpreting, talking unknown tongues, working miraculous cures, coming down with messages from God to the House of Commons. He has seen an old woman, with no talents beyond the cunning of a fortune-teller, and with the education of a scullion, exalted into a prophetess, and surrounded by tens of thousands of devoted followers, many of whom were, in station and knowledge, immeasurably her superiors; and all this in the nineteenth century, and all this in London. "Yet why not?" he asks; "for of the dealings of God with man no more has been revealed to the nineteenth century than to the first, or to London than to the wildest parish in the Hebrides."

We also have ceased to "wonder at any vagaries of superstition." Yet not because "no more of the dealings of God with man has been revealed to the nineteenth century than to the first"—for, if that were our rule of judging, we should be unable to know what superstition is, much less its vagaries. Our reason for not wondering at these superstitions is that the great mass of mankind, among whom superstitions are prevalent, never investigate the laws which govern their belief relative to the invisible world, or to any subject which is not susceptible of direct proof.

The love of the tangible, the love of the real, always has prevented the great proportion of mankind from examining the premises upon which the purely deductive notions of mankind are based. Some may be "expert logicians" on a given subject, while their lucubrations on an equally plain subject may well claim fellowship with the haziest lucubrations of the veriest scullion. A well-read scholar may fail as egregiously concerning subjects which do not lie in the line of his investigations as the tradesman in the pursuit of an avocation he has not learned. Else how can we account for the vagaries of opinion on questions which do not concern either a higher power or a future state? We have known a "well-educated" man, skilled in many branches of science, spend many years of an active life in attempting to refute Sir Isaac Newton's hypothesis of gravitation. We have known a man profoundly skilled in prominent departments of physical science reply to one who asked his opinion concerning a theological dogma, that he did not presume to settle such questions for himself, but confidently left such matters to the care of his religious advisers. Yet the world generally is not disagreed concerning the accuracy of Newton's hypothesis. And the world, we believe, would attach little importance to the opinions of one on matters which he had never investigated, even though he that offered such opinions should be eminent in various branches of science. Many well-educated men have embraced the vagaries of superstition; but so have many insane men reasoned profoundly on questions which do not belong to that category. Yet educated men are not generally prone to superstition, and insane men are usually considered incompetent judges of any subject which involves cautious observation and accurate ratiocination. Mental pathology furnishes many instances where a morbid state of feeling concerning subjects which have not been carefully investigated has produced monomania. Hence the anomaly. The belief in crude superstitions is quite as often the result of *morbid feeling* as of incautious thinking; and that the feelings of reputed wise men are often as ill-regulated as those of the vulgar portion of mankind experience amply testifies. The fact is, though an educated man may embrace vulgar superstitions, he furnishes merely an exception to the rule that educated men are not superstitious. He is but the exception to a great general fact. The *wise*, the *educated* portion of mankind alone furnish us with the standard by which we are competent to declare notions super-

stitious, and they alone present us with the premises by which we are enabled to combat these superstitions.

"The history of Catholicism strikingly illustrates these observations. During the last seven centuries the public mind of Europe has made constant progress in every department of secular knowledge. But in religion we can trace no constant progress. The ecclesiastical history of that long period is the history of movement to and fro. Four times since the authority of the Church of Rome was established in Western Christendom has the human intellect risen up against her yoke. Twice she remained completely victorious. Twice she came forth from the conflict bearing the marks of cruel wounds, but with the principle of life still strong within her. When we reflect on the tremendous assaults which she has survived, we find it difficult to conceive in what way she is to perish."

We submit that the history of Catholicism does not illustrate Mr. Macaulay's observations. These observations, except in a very meager sense, are not true; and even in this meager sense they furnish no support whatever to the hypothesis which he has endeavored to establish. His observations concern the non-progressiveness of *revealed* religion. Yet he draws conclusions from these observations to support an hypothesis which involves a very different meaning of the term religion—a meaning to which his observations are not applicable. The term *religion* is used in at least three very distinct senses. In the first sense, it means an embodied stock of truths, as in the phrase Revealed Religion. In the second sense, it may be said to represent the aggregate of all those relations denoted by such terms as righteousness and holiness. In the third sense, the term is applied to any given system of religious belief. The adjective *religious* includes no meaning which is not involved in one or the other of the definitions we have given. When we speak of a religious *movement*, the word movement expresses all the action which the term denotes, while the adjective is merely the relation we have affirmed of the movement. Hence the phrase denotes merely the movement of religionists, or movements which involve the progress or decline of any given system of faith; or of those changes in society which modify the influence of any particular system upon the mind of man. But the term progress may mislead. We use the term in this connection to include the greater degree in which a given theological system may impress the mind compared with the degree in which it has heretofore impressed it.

Now the observations of Mr. Macaulay apply to revealed religion alone.

When he refers to a swaying to and fro of the religious movements of the last seven centuries, he cannot refer to a swaying to and fro of revealed truths, because such an expression is as crude as it is absurd; and besides, according to his own showing, this stock of truth is susceptible neither of diminution nor of augmentation. Therefore there is no connection between his observations and the history of those movements which he assumed to illustrate his observations; and this want of connection furnishes a striking proof that all his observations on the subject are worthless relative to the hypothesis which they are assumed to establish. Mr. Macaulay states his premises with great care; but he fails in the first instance in which he attempts to apply them. But the paragraph which we have quoted not only furnishes no support to his hypothesis, but it is contradictory and inconsistent. The history of the last seven centuries, he says, is the history of movement to and fro. But it does not follow that the impulse forward would not include more elements of power than the reaction of that impulse. The rise of the tide of the ocean presents the phenomenon of a swaying to and fro, yet it does not follow that the tide is not constantly advancing, notwithstanding the petty wave-reactions that apparently prevent this movement. He says that in religion we can trace no constant progress. The word *constant*, on his hypothesis, is clearly an expletive. If we can trace progress in the least degree, his hypothesis is as clearly disproved as though this progress was exhibited with unvarying constancy. The progress of religion, of which Mr. Macaulay speaks, must evidently refer to the progress of Protestantism. His allusions concern this application of the term; and if we can show, from his own words, that Protestantism has progressed, we shall have presented a refutation of his entire argument. Now, if no progress has taken place, if that spirit which is the strength as well as the characteristic element of Protestantism, has not more powerfully and extensively developed itself during the lapse of time, then Mr. Macaulay should have represented the Church of Rome as remaining completely victorious after the last two of her four memorable conflicts with those who had risen up against her yoke instead of coming forth from the conflict "bearing the marks of cruel wounds, but with the principle of life still strong within her." The result of the last two conflicts proves that the Church of Rome

lost much of her strength. The strength, thus lost, Protestantism gained.

The revolt of the Languedocian provinces, and the deep stirring of the human mind by the high-souled Wiclif, though unsuccessful, proved that mighty forces were maturing which would ultimately burst forth with terrible effect on Catholic Christendom. The first insurrection against the Church of Rome scarcely arose when it was quelled. An insurrection still more powerful arose; it was crushed, though with far greater difficulty than the first insurrection. Slowly, but surely, did the elements of opposition gather increased force, until they burst forth with a momentum that was irresistible. The time-honored boundaries of the Church, though ably and desperately defended, were irreparably broken. Then came the reaction. But Protestantism had acquired a positive national basis—a basis from which she has not been shaken. Thus originated new conditions in the religious world. In the last memorable conflict with the Church of Rome, new elements were involved in the result. This contest originated in a Catholic country, and was occasioned as much by the corruptions of the Catholic Church as by the political grievances with which these corruptions were associated. Unfortunately, the corruptions of the church were identified with Christianity. This association, independent of other causes, necessitated a reaction. The reaction came—a revulsion in favor of a somewhat modified form of that system with which the revolutionists of France had been taught to consider Christianity indissolubly blended. This modification was a step towards Protestantism, for on the Catholic Church alone was the energy of the skeptics expended.

But we must close. We might, we think, have shown that the historical data which Mr. Macaulay has furnished us are fatal to his own hypothesis. We might have alluded to the circumstance that those nations of Europe which were most powerful at the period of the Reformation, and for fifty years subsequently to the time of Luther, have either exhibited unmistakable symptoms of decline, or changes adverse to Catholicism. We might have shown the decadence of Spain, of Portugal, of Italy. We might have alluded to the circumstance that France, at one time the very hotbed of Catholicism, drove a pope from the Holy City to end his days in mournful exile, a pope whose successor was restored to his dominions only through the dominancy of the powerful anti-Catholic

nations of Northern Europe. We might have exhibited the growth of these nations, and shown how they have absorbed the power once wielded by the despotisms of Southern Europe. We might have referred to our own vast continent—a continent discovered by a Catholic and consecrated to Catholicism—where Protestantism has realized its fairest fruits, the first-offering of still fairer fruits yet to come. But our article is already extended beyond reasonable limits. The *vitality* of Protestantism is the history of the last three hundred years. Conditions more unfavorable than those under which it has won its way to its present exalted position almost exceed the range of possibility.

The Church of Rome is a relic of bygone times. Though still powerful, the day of her ascendancy has long since passed. Every page of her history since the Reformation, rightly read, exhibits the proof of this very important fact—that the state of mind which at one time afforded her the means of existence has been constantly undergoing transformation into a state of mind uncongenial to the dominancy of any exclusive hierarchical system. Though she may never be directly overcome by an outward pressure, yet by coming in contact with those destructive forces constantly evolved by the restless activity of the human mind, she will so dwindle away that the semblance of her former self will scarcely be recognized. The elements of decay are bound up in her very constitution. Every system has an inevitable tendency to become modified by the lapse of time. But where, in a given system, radical defects are inseparable from its very framework—where a cankerous disease ramifies throughout its entire economy—where rottenness and soundness, barrenness and fruit, truth and error, are embraced in one common intertexture, the result must be more than modification. Time cannot fail to dissolve so incongruous an association. Whatever is sound, whatever is fruitful, whatever is true, can never lose its healthful vigor. But that which is barren, false, and therefore unprofitable, cannot, in the nature of things, enchain the reverence of mankind in an advanced state of religious, social, and political progress.

Protestantism imposes no trammels on this high development, and therefore it contains within itself the elements of progression. No amount of force can shake its deep foundations, because no force can be assumed which can alter the structure of the human mind. Hence it is the inseparable accompaniment of intellec-

tual activity. Hence its characteristic principle, freedom of thinking, has withstood the desperate assaults of the tyrannical systems of all time. With the progress of civilization, with refinement of morals, with purity of religion, it is inseparably identified. It is adapted to all states of society, to all conditions of mankind, to every system of positive belief. What the waves of the ocean cannot dash to pieces, they wear away. What Protestantism cannot immediately subdue it will irreparably undermine. It is bound up in the very heart's core of civilized society. Its development has been coetaneous with every great step of human progress. Its strength lies in the unfettered exercise of the mind. And it will, we have no doubt, flourish with augmented vigor when the despotisms of Southern Europe shall have been chronicled only as the dark phases of society in man's pilgrimage towards the goal of religious and political perfection. We feel confident that it will be infused into all our elements of being when some remote ancestor of the "traveller who shall take his stand on London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's," may, with a feeling akin to that which, on a memorable occasion, heaved the breast of England's stateliest historian, stand beneath the lofty dome of St. Peter's, and muse on The Decline and Fall of the SECOND ROMAN EMPIRE.

CHURCH AND STATE.

No. I.

DR. HODGSON is a patient and unwearied writer. It would require a bold eye to sweep the orbit in which he has proposed to move. To assume that the arguments which are spread throughout his communications are inconclusive, without making any attempt to show in what respect they are so, would be begging the question in controversy. Yet to follow a long-winded opponent through the minute sinuosities of his reasoning—even though a plentiful crop of fallacies, which would vitiate every fundamental position he has assumed, should await the gathering—is no slight task. Had I the ability, I have not the time, to accomplish it with any degree of satisfaction to myself. Still, I may be permitted, I trust, to state my conviction, after having read Dr. Hodgson's articles with much care and attention, and with an honest endeavor to underrate the importance of nothing that he has advanced, that no really sound argument can be urged against the propriety of introducing a lay delegation into the supreme councils of our Church. The few lingering doubts I had entertained on the subject he has done me the favor to remove. True, this opinion may be prematurely expressed, for the Doctor may not be half done. We may not be permitted for a year or two to gaze on the matured fruit of so marvellously protracted a gestation. By way of apology for the liberty I have taken to express this conviction, I propose to examine an argument to which Dr. Hodgson appears to attach much importance—an argument to which he repeatedly and confidently alludes—an argument which, if unsound, will render worthless a large portion of his elaborately wordy communications.

This argument, I conceive, involves one of the most blundering and naked fallacies I have ever seen in print.

Dr. Hodgson considers the assumption, that our system of church government is inimical to civil and religious liberty, to be wholly chimerical. Whether this assumption be well or ill-founded, it is not my purpose to inquire. Every candid and reflecting mind must at least acknowledge that, whatever may be assumed to be the ultimate tenden-

cies of this system, there is no ground for immediate apprehension, in view of the overwhelming influence of public sentiment—a sentiment which is reflected, to a certain extent, in the practical conduct of every religious denomination in the United States—a sentiment which operates in no slight measure on the minds of the most bigoted of the devotees of the most despotic church in Christendom. I have no reason to believe that the ministers of our Church are less attached to civil liberty, as such, than the most enlightened and progressive of our laymen. But that those who cherish the views advocated by Dr. Hodgson cling to a principle of church government which tends, collaterally, to weaken the basis on which true civil liberty rests, I firmly believe.

Let us now trace the course of reasoning by which Dr. Hodgson attempts to prove that the introduction of a lay delegation into the supreme councils of our Church tends to a union of Church and State.

"The great source of danger to our civil liberties," he remarks, "is in uniting, in the same persons, the highest ecclesiastical and the civil authority. This may be done in different ways. It may be done by placing both in the hands of ecclesiastics only, as in the governments of the papal denominations."

Here, the reader will perceive, the Church and State are already united.

"Or," he remarks, "in the hands of both laymen and ecclesiastics, as in England."

Here, also, are the Church and State united.

"Or," he continues, "in the hands of laymen only, as in the early governments of the New England States."

Here, too, the reader will observe, the Church is united with the State.

"Or," he finally remarks, "in those church governments which admit laymen in the supreme councils, as the Presbyterian, the Protestant Episcopalian, the Congregationalist, and other forms of church government. This tends directly and powerfully, if not infallibly, to the union of the Church and the State where they are not already united."

Here the clause, "where they are not already united," is clearly redundant; for it is absurd to affirm a *tendency* to the union of Church and State where the Church and State are united. It is contradictory if it is applied to the first three in the category of instances in which "the highest ecclesiastical" and the "civil authority" are assumed to be united in the same persons; for in these the union of the Church and the State actually exists. That the Church and State *may* be united where the "highest ecclesiastical" and the "civil authority" are in the same hands is so indisputable that it only requires to be stated to be

accepted. But the assumption that the possession, by the same persons, of the "highest ecclesiastical power" and the "civil authority" necessarily includes union of the Church and the State is a very different proposition, and one which has not yet been proved. Now to affirm that the "highest ecclesiastical" and "the civil authority" are united in the hands of the same persons in any religious denomination in the United States would be to assert what is notoriously not the fact—an assumption which Dr. Hodgson has not even attempted to prove.

What *tendency*, then, do these forms of government exhibit towards a union of Church and State?

"It is reasonable to suppose," says Dr. Hodgson, "that the laity will elect their most gifted and influential men to the supreme synods; especially those best acquainted with the science of government. To send inferior men in these respects would be to trifle with the right and privilege of lay delegation." Again: "To leave out Congressmen and Governors and eminent professional men would be to leave out the wisdom and experience supposed to be most needed. Hence, there would be men from the legislative, and judicial, and executive departments of civil government grasping and wielding, at the same time, the supreme power of the Church. This would give leading and ambitious men a fine chance to concoct and put into operation schemes by which the ministry could combine their influence for the aggrandizement of the civilian, and the civilian give his in return to promote the undue elevation of the ministry."

Are there no eminent "professional men" but Congressmen, Governors, and Judges? And might we not leave out Congressmen, Governors, and Judges, and yet retain a sufficient number of gifted men to deliberate, with judgment and attention, on all the questions which might come before the supreme councils of any given church? There are two great political parties in the United States. Each of them is capable of furnishing a plurality of men thoroughly competent to discharge all the functions of government, administrative, executive, and judicial. For each person who fills the office first in the gift of the people, each State could probably furnish at least two men, on the average, thoroughly *competent* to discharge the duties which appertain to it. Thus, there would be a wide margin for the selection of eminent and gifted men without choosing *one* legislator, State or national; *one* judge; or *one* governor. Some of the ablest statesmen our country has produced never belonged to any church. How many of our Congressmen are connected with one, I have not the means of knowing. But I am confident that we might safely pass by a large number of them in selecting church representatives without "trifling with the right and privilege of lay delegation." In

fact, the "trifling," in my opinion, would be exhibited in manifesting an unwillingness *not* to pass them by. Politics is a wily game; and it is by no means clear that a readiness to employ the tactics which most generally enable a candidate for civil honors to rise in the State, is precisely that quality which would indicate the possession of the "wisdom and experience supposed to be most needed" in our church councils.

But, granting that we should send Congressmen, Governors, and Judges to the supreme synods, Dr. Hodgson has merely asserted—he has not attempted to *prove*—that we should thus have "men from the legislative, and judicial, and executive departments of civil government, grasping and wielding at the same time the supreme power of the Church." These men would wield only a *part* of the supreme power of the Church.

But, where is the *tendency* to a union of Church and State? The only affirmation which meets the eye is the assumption that a lay delegation would afford "leading and ambitious men" a "fine chance" to combine their influence for the reciprocal aggrandizement of the civilian and the ministry. It is hardly necessary to inform so astute a logician as Dr. Hodgson that an "opportunity" to do evil, and a "tendency" to do evil, express very different ideas. Dr. Hodgson has a fine chance, in passing up the aisle to ascend his pulpit, to crush the bonnet over the head of any lady member of his congregation. Would he consider me justified in inferring thence that he has a *tendency* to insult the ladies of his congregation, and thus to desecrate the Church of God? Ought he therefore to abstain from entering the aisles of his church? Is it thence *wrong* to enter them? Our National and State assemblies afford "leading and ambitious" men a fine "chance" to "concoct and put in operation" schemes which are detrimental to the public welfare. Our General and Annual Conferences afford "leading and ambitious" clergymen a fine chance "to concoct and put in operation schemes" pernicious to the Church. Should we therefore dispense with our civil and ecclesiastical assemblies? Is it possible, in fact, to conceive of a state of society, except that in which all mankind are assumed to be morally and intellectually perfect, which would not afford a fine chance for the "concoction" of schemes detrimental to the public weal?

Is it altogether inconceivable that a lay delegation would afford laymen a fine chance to prevent the execution of schemes which ambitious *clergymen* may concoct? Would not leading men, clerical and lay, gifted with sufficient sagacity to detect the machinations of the evil-minded, and stimulated by regard for the welfare of the Church, have a glorious "chance" to counteract all the schemes which "leading and ambitious" laymen and clergymen can concoct?

The argument, then, may be thus summarily presented:—

Whatever association or system affords a chance to do evil has necessarily a *tendency to do evil*;

The General Conference is an association which affords a chance to do evil;

Therefore, the General Conference is an association which necessarily *tends to do evil*.

Dr. Hodgson appears to have felt a latent misgiving that his illustration is inconclusive; that he had no tangible basis on which to hypothesize any conclusion which would establish the validity of his assumptions, for he at once proceeds to give us an illustration, which, for its originality, is certainly deserving the attention of the inquisitive layman. The quiet and happy manner in which he attempts, by means of it, to dispose of the proposition which it was his duty to prove, is beyond all praise. To this illustration I shall allude in my next article.

No. II.

"To estimate fairly and fully the tendency of any system," Dr. Hodgson remarks, "we must place it in the most prosperous circumstances—in circumstances most favorable to its producing its natural results. At present, all tendencies to the union of Church and State are held in abeyance by the multiplicity and jealousy of sects."

Therefore, it follows that the illustration to which the attention of the reader has already been directed, is absurd, inasmuch as it is based on a condition of things which involves the existence of this "multiplicity and jealousy of sects." It also follows that, so long as this "multiplicity and jealousy of sects" shall exist, all tendencies to a union of Church and State will *remain* in abeyance. It also follows that, so long as Dr. Hodgson is unable to indicate, even by approximation, the period when sects shall cease to be numerous, and to be jealous of one another, he is unable to affirm that a lay delegation in the supreme councils of any church tends to a union of Church and State. Accordingly, a lay delegation in the supreme councils of the Methodist Episcopal Church would not tend to produce a union of Church and State, inasmuch as it would neither augment nor diminish the number of existing sects.

Thus, Dr. Hodgson has cleverly disposed of his own argument; but he makes a bold, desperate, and exceedingly unique effort to show that a lay delegation *must* tend to unite the Church and the State.

"Suppose," he says, "that any one of the churches which admit laymen in their highest councils—the Protestant Episcopal, for example—should be favored with the highest prosperity. Suppose that Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, Lutherans, German Reformed, Dutch Reformed, Methodist Protestants, and Quakers, should be finally merged in its ministry and membership. Suppose that they should acknowledge practically the obligation to elect good men to civil office, and also, what would (in Dr. Hodgson's opinion) be very natural, that they should elect the same men to the church legislature." Suppose that these men should complain of the inconvenience, after having spent the winter at Washington or Harrisburg, of leaving their homes and travelling to distant places, to attend the General or Diocesan Conventions, and should suggest the propriety of holding these conventions at the close of the sessions of Congress, and at the State Capitals during the sessions of the State Legislatures. Suppose that they should advocate the new arrangement on the score of economy, inasmuch as "the mileage paid by the State government would serve for the Church as well as the State. This consideration," Dr. Hodgson thinks, "could not fail to have its influence, inasmuch as many delegates to ecclesiastical bodies are deterred from attending them in consequence of the expense." Here closes the concatenation of suppositions; and the Doctor boldly, broadly, and dogmatically affirms, "The next proposition," he says, "and it would very soon be made, would be that, as the lay members of the civil legislature and of the church are the same, and all good and true men having the good of the Church and of the State equally at heart, the business of church legislation could easily be attended to in the national councils, allowing the clergy a distinct representation. And every principle which can, with any plausibility, be urged in favor of lay delegation in supreme church councils, argues as forcibly in favor of clerical delegates in the national councils."

The Doctor should have gone a step farther. He should have supposed that this proposition would be accepted. He should have supposed that the Church and State would be united. What then? Why, the Church and State *would* be united. He would thus have proved that a lay delegation not only *tends* to produce, but that it infallibly produces, a union of Church and State. He would thus have augmented the force of his manifold suppositions. But, in fact, why *suppose* that we should add so important a link to so magnificent a chain? How does Dr. Hodgson *know* that the proposition to unite the Church and the State would be made? Why not *know* that it would be accepted? Why not *know* that the Church and State would be united? Why not *know*

that a lay delegation infallibly produces a union of Church and State? Why *suppose* any thing at all?

In the first illustration, Dr. Hodgson attempts to work out his conclusions by means of a dark picture in which "leading and ambitious men" occupy the foreground. In the present illustration, the picture is reversed. The "leading and ambitious men" have disappeared; and, in their stead, we have "good men and true; men who have the good of the Church and of the State equally at heart." To estimate "fairly and fully" the tendency of any system we must, "in our reasoning," place it in circumstances of the highest prosperity, and then *suppose* all the conditions to be present which will enable us to work out the conclusion at which we wish to arrive relative to what we have affirmed to be its "natural results," and *covertly assume* the absence of all those elements which it might prove highly inconvenient for us to take into consideration. This method is profoundly and strikingly suggestive. It is also highly convenient, for it will enable us to prove the existence of anything simply by *supposing* it to exist. If that method of proof will not enable us to silence a sturdy opponent, we can prove our proposition to be true by affirming that we *know* it to be so. Our opponent must then perforce make his best bow, and retire from the field.

In the first illustration, I repeat, the tendency to the result so ardently deprecated is deduced from the *chance* which is afforded to work out ambitious schemes. In the second, the conclusion is conveniently arrived at by supposing the existence of the very tendencies required to be proved; in other words, the tendency of a lay delegation to produce a union of Church and State is deduced from its *supposed* tendency to produce the result in question. Dr. Hodgson thus reasons in a complete circle. He arrives at his conclusion that a lay delegation tends to unite the Church and the State by *supposing* certain conditions to exist which, in his opinion, are competent to produce this union; and he then infers these conditions to exist because they are what he assumes to be the "natural results" of a lay delegation. That is to say, he proves his conclusion by his premises, and his premises by his conclusion. He seems to be totally forgetful of the fact that his conclusion is hypothecated on the assumption that the "natural results" of a lay delegation include a tendency to the union of Church and State, which is begging the proposition to be proved.

1. We thus see that, in the first illustration, Dr. Hodgson undertakes to prove that a lay delegation *tends* to do what, by his own distinct admission, it does not tend to do, inasmuch as all *tendencies* to the union of Church and State are at present held in *abeyance*.

2. In the second illustration, his modes of proving the said tendency

may be generalized by stating that he covertly assumes two propositions as true which are clearly absurd: 1. That a result will necessarily happen where conditions can be imagined by which it might probably happen. 2. That no conditions adequate to prevent the said result can be logically assumed to exist. With respect to the first, I reply thus: Water and other fluids exist, by which Dr. Hodgson may be drowned. *Ergo*, Dr. Hodgson must necessarily be drowned. With respect to the second, I reply thus: But Dr. Hodgson is a cautious man, and avoids deep water; accordingly, he may not be drowned. And with respect to his side of the argument, he wisely refrains from undertaking to prove that the absence of lay delegates in our supreme church councils includes *all* conceivable securities against a union of Church and State.

Dr. Hodgson's illustration affords a fine subject for a running commentary; but want of space compels me to waive its introduction. Nevertheless, I cannot dismiss it without making a few observations which its consideration has suggested.

The Church must be separate from the State before the two can be united. With or without a lay delegation, it is conceivable that any church may absorb every person in the State. Success, then, is an indispensable condition of its union with the State. What, now, is that *specific* condition without which the union cannot take place? Evidently, that those who are interested in the result shall *will* to bring it about. The result cannot be otherwise accomplished. This specific condition may be present or absent in a church with or without a lay delegation.

If, now, the ministry of a church which does not admit laymen in its supreme councils are not assumed to be willing to consent to so organic a modification in their ecclesiastical constitution as the supposed change would require, the ministry of a church which has lay delegates in its supreme councils can be assumed to be equally unwilling that the same result shall be accomplished. If the laity are assumed forcibly to consummate the unholy alliance in the one case, they may be assumed to consummate the alliance forcibly in the other case. The fundamental question which remains to be solved is: What absolute *security* is there that this exercise of the will shall be manifested by the members of a church which admits laymen in its supreme assemblies, and that it shall remain in interminable abeyance among the members of a church in which supreme power is held by the clergy alone? Will Dr. Hodgson be so kind as to inform us? Will he aver that the restriction of supreme ecclesiastical power to the ministry would afford that security? I reply that the diffusion of supreme ecclesiastical power among the lay members of the church would afford a security equally efficient. In the Roman Catholic Church, supreme power is restricted to the pastorate. Yet is

not this very church united to the Austrian and Spanish States? But granting, for the sake of the argument, that the restriction of supreme power to the clergy would be an adequate preventive of the unholy alliance, what security have we that this power will *continue to be* restricted to the clergy in a "highly prosperous state of the church?" If a church with lay delegates in its supreme councils is assumed to be powerless under the seductive blandishments of the State, why may not a church, which has no lay delegation, listen to the voice of the charmer, partake of the forbidden fruit, and fall from its high estate?

Estimating, then, the relative tendencies, other things being equal, of a church without a lay delegation, and of a church with a lay delegation, to become united with the State, I should be inclined, for the following reasons, to assign the higher degree of elective affinity to the former:—

If a purely clerical body were to propose to a purely civil body a reciprocation of legislative prerogatives, the parties would meet to a certain extent on equal terms. But the case would be very different with a body of ministers forming a part of a laico-clerical body, and a body of men who, as in Dr. Hodgson's illustration, are assumed to wield solely the supreme power of the State. The ministry could not consistently say to these men: Grant us, *as* ministers, a share in the supreme power of the State, and we will grant you a share in the supreme power of the Church. Why? Because, by the terms of the illustration, the laymen referred to are assumed to share co-ordinately in the ecclesiastical power. The ministry would have nothing to grant; the laity would obtain no equivalent for what they would surrender.

Hence any motive, inclining the laity to unite the Church and the State, which is based on covetousness of a share in the supreme power of the Church could not rationally, in this case, be affirmed of them; whereas, in a Church without lay representation, the laity might covet a share in this ecclesiastical power to a degree which would induce them to unite the Church with the State in order to obtain it. Accordingly, all rational securities against the union of the Church and State are, it appears to me, based, other things being equal, on the constitution of those churches which admit laymen to a joint participation of legislative prerogatives in their supreme councils.

Moreover, Dr. Hodgson cannot logically restrict his argument to any one church in our country, because the very phrase *one church* implies that other churches exist which may establish his conclusion as well as the Methodist Episcopal Church. Neither can he assume any one church to become all-powerful while other churches exist. Consequently, an all-powerful church implies the subjugation of all other churches; and since

this all-powerful church may be the Roman Catholic quite as plausibly as the Methodist Episcopal Church, it follows that, to establish his grand conclusion against lay delegation, Dr. Hodgson renders himself liable to abandon his faith as a Wesleyan, to yield up his share of supreme governing power as a Methodist minister, and to become a very priest.

In fact, the whole argument may be presented within the compass of a nutshell. Should any one church become all-powerful, and should the lay members of that church *choose* to unite the Church and the State, they could and doubtless would do so, whether the church had or had not a lay delegation in its supreme councils. If the ministry should not like the proposed change, they might receive very significant hints to "go elsewhere." If the laity, as in Dr. Hodgson's illustration, are not assumed to be too good to change the constitutions both of their Church and State so as to unite the one to the other, I do not see why the ministry should be assumed to be too good to feel willing to sacrifice their church constitution for the same purpose. If a lay delegation affords no security against the union of Church and State, assuredly no security is afforded by a church which forbids laymen to participate in its legislative councils.

No. III.

"ANY principle," says Dr. Hodgson, "which can, with any plausibility, be urged in favor of lay delegation in the supreme councils of the church, argues quite as strongly in favor of clerical delegates in the councils of the State."

This extract may be selected as a favorable example to expose a fallacy which runs through many of Dr. Hodgson's essays on lay delegation. The plain English of the sentence is, simply, when divested of all redundancy, that any argument which would justify the introduction of a lay delegation in the supreme councils of the M. E. Church would justify a union of the Church and the State.

This argument deserves a careful examination.

The word *lay*, as well as its cognates, *laic*, *laymen*, and *laity*, denotes different meanings. It may be applied, 1. To any member of the *State* who is not a clergyman; 2. To any member of the *Church* who is not a clergyman. The first is its English sense. The second is its strict and legitimate American sense. In England the Church is co extensive with the State; and hence an infidel is there as much a layman as the most upright religionist when compelled by law to pay tithes toward the support of the Established Church. In the United States, there is

no Established Church. Hence, in relation to the State, or in relation to a Church supported by statute law, there are no laymen. Accordingly, to obtain laymen, we must enter within the precincts of the various religious sects in our land. Consequently, in the United States a layman is one who is so correlative to a clergyman that both are members of a religious sect.

To which of these meanings does Dr. Hodgson refer in the quotation I have made from his essay? If he assigns to the term its English sense, I reply that in this sense no lay delegation is claimed in the United States. Therefore, the principle which he has enunciated has nothing to do with the question in controversy.

If he employs the term in its American sense, the fallacy of his argument is transparent. The argument virtually assumes that the distribution of a given amount of ecclesiastical power among certain *individuals* of the religious class of our citizens is a legitimate reason why a *class* of religionists, as such, should form a constituent part of the governing machinery of the State. Dr. Hodgson forgets that the laity and the clergy are simply distinct individuals of some sectarian kind of the religious class in the State. Else what becomes of the non-religionists, who, according to this argument, would form no part of the State? As well might the Grand Masters of the Masonic lodges in the United States affirm that any principle which would justify the investiture of the governed members of their order with a share in the supreme power of their organization is an equally good reason for introducing a delegation of Master Masons in the councils of the State; for the distinction between the clergy and the laity is no more a State-created distinction than is the distinction between a Master Mason and an Apprentice Mason a State-created distinction. Any principle which is good to support the argument of Dr. Hodgson is quite as good to support the incorporation of any private mechanical or other association with the State in a case where the majority of its members claim a share in the supreme power of the organization against a minority who affirm that it is as reasonable to unite the said association with the State as to accede the justness of the claim.

"I would have no minister of the Gospel in Congress," Dr. Hodgson says, "until he has given up his parchments as an elder in the church. Nor would I allow any layman to unite civil and ecclesiastical power in his possession, by sitting in the civil legislature and in the supreme councils of the church."

Here the English and the American sense of "layman" are so confounded as to produce a fallacy which Dr. Hodgson may clearly see if he will inform us how a man can unite two things which the statute law

of the land does not permit him to unite. Cannot he see that, as a *layman*, no man can hold civil office in our land? As a citizen, a man may share in the supreme power of the State; and as a layman, he may share in the supreme power of a given church. To speak of the civil power which he holds as *lay* power is just as absurd as it is to speak of the civil power which a Master Mason may exercise in Congress as *Masonic* power.

"I hold in almost equal detestation," Dr. Hodgson further remarks, "a lay-governed Church, and a priest-governed State."

Again, I ask: To which of the two senses of the term "lay" must we understand him to refer? To the English or to the American sense? It is possible for Dr. Hodgson to detest more things than one. If he refers to the English sense, his illustration has no applicability to the present controversy. If he refers to the American sense, his argument involves a twofold absurdity, as far as it is designed to bear on the question which he has undertaken to discuss. In the first place, it covertly assumes that the government which the laity of the M. E. Church propose to establish is an exclusively lay government, whereas it is a lay and *clerical* government which is claimed. Dr. Hodgson would thus be forced to include in his detestation a clerical-governed church, inasmuch as the church, in the case assumed, would be governed as much by the clergy as the laity. In the second place, it assumes that the claim of a non-ruling member of a specific religious association *in* the State to have a share in the supreme governing power of the said religious association, and the claim of a ruling member of this association to connect his religion directly *with* the State through distinct representation in our State and national councils, are claims of *almost* equivalent value. As well might we affirm that the claim of a non-ruling Mason to participate in the supreme governing power of his order, and the claim of a ruling Mason to connect his organization directly with the State, are of almost equivalent value.

This last passage, Dr. Hodgson has been kind enough to explain, for the benefit of Mr. Isaiah Toy, in a Pickwickian sense. He detests the chair, not the chairman. He wishes us to understand that he detests the system of admitting laymen into the supreme councils of the church; not that he detests the laymen. But has he never heard of a certain young woman who kicked her lover's dog out of the house, and thus caused him to depart, after remarking to her: "If you respect me, you should respect my dog; else I am liable to share your kicks for thoroughly supporting him!" When I affirm that Dr. Hodgson rebukes sin, I speak quite as metonymically as he affirms that he speaks himself when he declares that he refers to a lay-governed church in the abstract,

not in the concrete, as the object of his detestation. Dr. Hodgson detests Catholicism. A Catholic would not be a Catholic unless he combined within himself those detestable qualities which, in their *tout ensemble*, constitute Catholicism. "To rebuke Catholicism" is a metonymical figure of speech. Hence we must rebuke the Catholic who combines within himself those qualities which, abstracted, are assumed to be the objects of detestation. To oppose Catholicism, we must oppose Catholics. To oppose lay delegation, Dr. Hodgson must oppose lay-delegationists. As laymen, he would neither oppose nor detest them. But, as *lay-delegationists*, he must both oppose and detest them. Why? Because they *approve* and *support* lay delegation. In plain terms, when Dr. Hodgson affirms that he detests a lay-governed church, he plainly affirms that to the extent laymen *are* lay-delegationists, they are the proper objects of his detestation.

But, according to Dr. Hodgson's argument, our Federal Union is a priest-governed State. Why? Because, according to the law of the land, every clergyman who is a citizen has as much voice in selecting our ruler as any other man. By the same law, every clergyman, *ceteris paribus*, is just as eligible to its highest offices as any other citizen. If Dr. Hodgson affirms that no one is admitted into our national councils as a *clergyman*, I reply that no one is admitted into those councils as a *layman*. Hence, as both laymen and clergymen have equal privileges before the law relative to civil honors, it is logical to conclude, agreeably to Dr. Hodgson's premises, that the American Union is a priest-governed State, inasmuch as the power which the clergy have in the State is as much priest power as the power which the laity exercise in the State is lay power, and inasmuch as Dr. Hodgson has asserted that a church which is *partly* lay-governed is a *lay*-governed church.

In Essay No. 8, Dr. Hodgson says: "There would be as much propriety in ministers clamoring for distinct representation, by ministers, in the several departments of civil government, as there is in this demand of laymen for a distinct representation, by laymen, in the councils of the church."

I ask, in which sense, the American or the English, are we to understand the term "laymen?" If in the English sense, the illustration, as I have stated, once and again, has no relation to the present controversy. I will cheerfully admit that it is just as reasonable that religionists should be distinctly represented by religionists in the councils of the State as that civilians should be distinctly represented by civilians in the councils of the Church. But that is not the question we are discussing. If Dr. Hodgson refers to the American sense, the argument amounts simply to this: It is just as reasonable for the ruling members of a private asso-

ciation to be distinctly represented in the General Government, as for a non-ruling member of that association to be distinctly represented in the particular government of that specific association. The laity might, therefore, apply the same argument, and say: It is just as reasonable that we should be distinctly represented, *as* laymen, in the General Government, as that ministers should be distinctly represented in the supreme councils of the church; and thus logically, on Dr. Hodgson's own premises, prove the necessity of a union of Church and State.

Dr. Hodgson's argument affords another illustration of reasoning in a circle. The reader will observe that the question in controversy is strictly one of disputed classification. The whole argument depends on the meaning of the term *layman*. Dr. Hodgson can show the claim of the ministry to be distinctly represented in the councils of the State, and the claim of the laity to be distinctly represented in the supreme councils of their specific church, to be of equivalent value, only by assigning to the term "lay" a meaning which I have designated its English sense. Hypothecating his conclusion on the assumption of the existence of a union of Church and State, agreeably to this employment of the term, he thence argues that a lay delegation as naturally involves a union of Church and State as a distinct representation of ministers in the councils of the State. This is a self-evident proposition. Why? Because, when presented in its naked simplicity, it amounts to the declaration that a united Church and State are a united Church and State, whether the union be produced by clergymen or by those who are not clergymen. Thus, Dr. Hodgson conveniently proves that a lay delegation argues in favor of a union of Church and State, by assigning to the term *lay* a meaning which implies the existence of a union of Church and State. He thus covertly assumes the truth of his proposition as the basis of proving the said proposition.

If, however, the term "lay" be used in its American sense, there is no analogy between the two claims. To grant the claims of the clergy, would be to unite the Church and the State. To grant the claims of the laity would not involve the union of Church and State; else the Church and State are already united in all Churches in the United States except the Roman Catholic and the Methodist Episcopal Church.

The fallacy of Dr. Hodgson's argument may also be clearly seen by regarding it from another point of view. It is, or it is not, legitimate to infer the measure of power the ministry should enjoy in the State, from the measure of power possessed by the laity in the Church. If the negative be admitted, Dr. Hodgson's argument is worthless. If the affirmative be claimed, he has assumed a premise of a very compre-

hensive character. It follows, then, that if the laity have the money-power of the Church, the clergy ought to possess the money-power of the State. The argument proves quite as much for *administrative* power as for legislative power. The laity fill administrative offices in the Church; therefore the clergy should fill administrative offices in the State. The laity are stewards and trustees in the Church; therefore the clergy should be postmasters and sheriffs in the State. The Doctor appears to have forgotten the caution which Mr. Macaulay gives relative to the danger of assuming as true an extensive major premise which may include a number of minor premises which it would be very inconvenient to advance.

Not only so, but Dr. Hodgson's argument logically involves the very thing which he so earnestly deprecates. By forcibly dragging in the State as a party to the question in discussion, he has unconsciously invoked an element which nullifies his whole argument. This argument works in two directions: If the measure of power enjoyed by the laity in the Church is the measure of power which the ministry should enjoy in the State, it follows that the ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church should either share their supreme power with the laity, inasmuch as they have, as individual citizens, as much power in the State as the laity have as individual citizens, or they are usurpers of political power, according to the same principle that the laity are usurpers of ecclesiastical power, when participating with the ministry in the supreme functions of their church government. Hence, on precisely the same hypothesis which he brings forward to show that a clerical delegation in the State, and a lay delegation in the Church, are claims of equivalent value, the State may claim a share in the power of the Church equal to that which is represented by the aggregate votes of the ministers, as citizens, in the State, inasmuch as this claim would be of the same value as that urged by Dr. Hodgson. Hence, to disprove the claims of the laity, Dr. Hodgson makes use of an argument which, if sound, proves that to the extent that ministers exercise the elective franchise in the State, our noble republic is a priest-governed State. Dr. Hodgson may handle his logical knife in whatever way he pleases. It is sure to cut his fingers.

THE BASIS OF SUFFRAGE.

MR. BELISLE :—*Dear Sir.*—As the conductor of a public journal, you have necessarily devoted much attention to questions of a political character. Accordingly, if you will permit the liberty I take, I would respectfully request you to show me why, other things being equal, a person of African descent, born in this country, has not as valid a claim to the privilege of the elective franchise as a white man. I make this request because, after prolonged reflection, I have been unable to arrive at any reason clearly proving that a white man ought to possess the elective franchise which does not prove, at the same time, that a person of African descent ought to possess it. An exhaustive answer to my inquiry would much oblige,

Respectfully yours,

Oct. 20, 1858.

PUBLIUS.

REMARKS.—In reply to the question of our correspondent, "PUBLIUS," so respectfully asked—"Why, other things being equal, a person of African descent, born in this country, has not as *valid* a claim to the privilege of the elective franchise as a white man?"—we shall go back to *first* principles of the organic law. And we presume "PUBLIUS" will agree with us in the assertion that *all rights of a political or legal character are created by the fundamental instrument upon which the laws of a country are based*. This being a demonstrative fact, there can be NO VALID CLAIM for usurping a privilege which *that* instrument does not confer. The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States reads thus :—

We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and *secure the blessings of liberty to OURSELVES and OUR POSTERITY*, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Here we have, in the organic charter of our country, an absolute declaration of the purposes and objects which led to the union of the States, among which was that for "*securing the blessings of liberty to OURSELVES and OUR POSTERITY*." Now, the reasonable inference is, that, if those who drew up that Constitution, and those who adopted it, were *white men*, they drew it up and adopted it for the purpose of *self-protection* by ignoring the *right* of the African race to the franchises of government. We have *no right to go beyond their action*, for that action and that Constitution are still the organic law of

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the land. But, if our correspondent can show that the men who made and adopted the Constitution of the United States *were* African, *and we are their posterity*, then is the scale reversed, and we will acknowledge that they have "as valid a claim to the elective franchise" as white men. We will go further, and say, they *alone* have the right to its exercise. Until, however, PUBLIUS can demonstrate to us that a white man is the *offspring* of a Negro—or that the white race is the *progenitors* of the African, we must content ourselves with the action of our constitution-makers, and admire their wisdom in reference to the disfranchisement of the colored race.

MR. BELISLE : *Dear sir*—I thank you for your courteous response to my inquiry. That it is unsatisfactory is due, perhaps, to myself—not to you. I asked, "Why, other things being equal, a person of African descent, born in this country, has not as valid a claim to the privilege of the elective franchise as a white man?" In reply to this question, you affirm that "*all rights of a political or legal character are created by the fundamental instrument on which the laws of a country are based*." Pardon me for deeming this proposition somewhat vague. Colored persons undoubtedly have civil rights. Hence, it is only necessary to show that such persons have civil rights to prove, according to your own showing, that they are entitled to the franchises of government, inasmuch as these rights are of a legal character, and inasmuch as all such rights are, according to your own assumption, "created by the fundamental instrument upon which the laws of a country are based."

The argument may be thus syllogistically presented :—

1. All rights of a legal character are created by the fundamental instrument on which the laws of a country are based :
Civil rights are of a legal character :
Therefore, civil rights are created by the fundamental instrument, etc.
2. Whoever possesses civil rights possesses rights created by the fundamental instrument on which the laws of a country are based :
Colored persons enjoy civil rights :
Therefore, colored persons enjoy rights created by the fundamental instrument, etc.

If this reasoning be sound, your conclusion that there can be "no valid claim for usurping a privilege which that instrument does not confer," is inapplicable to the case in point, for the privilege, thus assumed to be usurped, rests, according to your own showing, upon a legal basis.

Your language relative to "usurpation" seems to be susceptible of diverse interpretations. Do you mean to assert that the fact that a given organic law does not confer a privilege claimed is adequate proof that the claim is invalid, and therefore should not be conceded? Or do you mean to affirm that no claim can be valid which usurps any-

thing? Or do you mean to affirm that it is usurpation to claim anything which the organic law of a land does not confer?

I accept, for the sake of the argument, either or all of these alternatives. Accordingly, it follows that our forefathers, when they declared their independence of Great Britain, usurped the privileges they claimed, because they claimed what the organic law of the British realm did not confer; and, hence, they had no *valid claim* to their Independence.

Your reference to the preamble to our National Constitution would seem to imply your conviction that our right to the elective franchise is derivable from that Constitution. This view seems to me to be clearly erroneous, except with reference to aliens; and even aliens exercise the privileges conferred on them by Congress mediately through forms imposed by State, in contradistinction to Federal, law. The qualifications of citizenship are prescribed by the sovereign power of the several States, *not* by the United States. No native inhabitant of a State can derive his right to the elective franchise from the Federal government, but from the State in which he was born or resides. Hence, the only law which can be affirmed to be *organic* with reference to his claims to the elective franchise is the Constitution of said State. Accordingly, if any State confers the elective franchise on its native-born inhabitants of African descent, and invests them with all the immunities and privileges which its white inhabitants enjoy, no arguments drawn from the assumed fact that white persons formed and adopted the Federal Constitution can be pleaded as an offset to the validity of their claim to the elective franchise. The Federal government has nothing to do with the conditions of their citizenship. Thus, in several States of the Union, colored persons habitually exercise the elective franchise, and vote for representatives who help to make laws for our Union.

I admit that one of the leading objects which led to the Union of the States was "to secure the blessings of liberty to OURSELVES and OUR POSTERITY." But I cannot agree with you "that the reasonable inference from this language is that, if those who drew up the Constitution, and those who adopted it, were *white men*, they drew it up and adopted it for the purpose of *self-protection*, by ignoring the right of the African race to the franchises of government;" because you have incorporated in your inference an assumption that *white men* solely drew up and adopted the Constitution, which is assuming the proposition to be proved.

But granting, for the sake of the argument, what I will not grant as the fact in the case, that white men alone formed and adopted that Constitution, the inference would by no means be clear that they formed and adopted it for the purpose of *self-protection* by ignoring the *right* of the

African race to the franchises of government. The "reasonableness" of your inference is hypothecated on the assumption that the liberties of our forefathers and their descendants were regarded as insecure, by those who drew up and adopted our Federal Constitution; unless the rights of the African race to the franchises of government were ignored—an assumption I cannot concede without substantial proof. As well might we affirm that, because those who drew up and adopted our Federal Constitution were white men, they drew it up and adopted it for the purpose of *self-protection* by ignoring the right of the Indians to acquire the franchises of government; and yet the Supreme Court of the United States has declared that there is no constitutional impediment to the enfranchisement of the Indians.

Had I space, I would assign several reasons why I regard your inference as eminently unreasonable. At present I will simply state that individuals of the African race were voting members of several of the constituencies represented by those who drew up the Federal Constitution. Hence, the assumption that white men had the right, in the Federal Convention, to ignore rights which rested upon precisely the same basis whence the right of ignoring claimed by you can alone be assumed to be deducible, involves, in my opinion, a clear contradiction in terms.

You affirm that "we have no right to go beyond the action" of those who framed the Federal Constitution. Excuse me for reminding you that you have done the very thing which you assert I have no right to do. Not only so, but your affirmation is grounded on the assumption that the "action" referred to was what you claim it to be, which is begging the proposition to be proved. Prove first that the rights of the African race were ignored by those who drew up and adopted the Federal Constitution, and then it will be time to inquire whether it is legitimate to go beyond their action.

Your statement that it is incumbent on me, in order to disprove your assumption, to show that the white race is descended from the African, or the African from the white race, can scarcely be considered applicable to the question under discussion; for, even granting that the white race never has conferred the elective franchise on persons of the African race, it is, without doubt, logically conceivable that they might have conferred it upon them.

Very respectfully yours,

Nov. 6, 1858.

PUBLIUS.

REMARKS.—The extreme prolixity of our correspondent's remarks precludes us from replying in *extenso*. In fact, it needs but a few words to dissipate the technical points upon which his hypothesis is based. The question submitted

for us to answer is: "Why, other things being equal, a person of African descent, born in this country, has not *as valid* a claim to the privilege of the elective franchise as a white man?" Our response was and is because the organic law of the land *does not* confer that validity upon the colored race, but expressly and unequivocally disfranchises them. This is clearly and incontrovertibly indicated in the Preamble to our National Constitution, and we asserted then, as we assert now, that so long as that Constitution remains the fundamental instrument upon which the laws of the country are based, we have *no right* to go beyond it. PUBLIUS thinks "this proposition somewhat vague," and declares that "colored persons undoubtedly have *civil rights*." No one ever disputed that. But, in what do those "civil rights" consist? Undoubtedly, nothing *beyond* those which the laws of the land confer. They have the "civil right" to marry among themselves—to receive the benefits of our schools—to exercise the rights of conscience—to accumulate property—to buy and sell—to engage in any lawful business. These are "civil rights" conferred on, and guaranteed to all—rights which were given to them by the action of the Convention which framed our National Constitution. But, when it comes to the *law-making* prerogative, their *right* to that privilege is denied, and, we think, very properly. To this, however, our correspondent objects, by premising a syllogism asserting, that "individuals of the African race were voting members of several of the constituencies represented by those who drew up the Federal Constitution." This assertion is erroneous, and we defy PUBLIUS to cite a single instance where negroes voted for members to that Convention—for he knows that every State in the Union at that time, except *one*, was a slaveholding State, and the colored race were not allowed to vote. Probably our correspondent has based his untenable assumptions upon the parenthetical portion of his question—"other things being equal"—as applicable to the African race. We have never admitted the *equality*, if he applies it comparatively to the white man—for there is just as wide a difference in all the characteristics of nature between the African and the white races as there is between daylight and darkness. Our forefathers were cognizant of this *inferiority* when they constitutionally ignored their right to the elective franchise—and those states which permit negro suffrage by virtue of property qualifications have done so in direct violation of the Federal Constitution. We see nothing in the *specialties* of PUBLIUS's syllogisms to change our former views, and we mean to hold him strictly to his original proposition—the question of right.

MR. BELISLE: DEAR SIR—When I state that I have sent you but a portion of what I have written, I trust you will believe that I have not wantonly trespassed on the columns of your excellent little Journal. I will now be as brief as my time and my skill will permit.

1. You think but a few words are required to "dissipate the technical points" upon which my "hypothesis" is based. I answer, that I have presented no hypothesis, and have brought forward no *technical* points. You took the lead in the discussion; I followed you; and all the argu-

ments I adduced, and all the terms I employed, lie, as far as I can see, within the domain of general reasoning.

2. Your response to the question I propounded "was and is," you say, "because the organic law of the land expressly and unequivocally disfranchises" colored persons. But the proof of this affirmation has not been forthcoming. Where is this expression to be found? You still beg the question in controversy. The terms "our" and "ourselves" are assuredly as predicable of members of the African, as of the white race. Accordingly, to show that, when used in the preamble to our National Constitution, their application is specifically restricted to the white race, you are required to go beyond that instrument. But you affirm we have *no right* to go beyond it. Hence, if we have no right to go beyond it, and if the specific restriction you claim for the white race is not named in it, it follows that the said specific restriction is not demonstrable, inasmuch as you have hopelessly closed up all the avenues through which any demonstration could be attempted. If the specific restriction you claim is contained in the instrument, produce it, and the question is settled.

3. No one, you say, ever disputed the fact that colored persons possess civil rights. But you do not seem to perceive that the admission of this fact renders your postulate worthless. Unless you correct your postulate, my syllogisms are fatal to your reasoning.

4. Civil rights, you affirm, were given to colored persons "by the action of the Convention which framed our National Constitution." I would be much obliged to you if you would specifically indicate the "action" by which, in the Federal Convention, *civil*, as distinguished from *other rights*, were given colored persons. "When it comes to the *law-making* prerogative," you say, "their *right* to that privilege is denied." Please give me the specific part of those proceedings where that right is denied. I refer, of course, to free, native-born persons of African descent; for I cannot suppose you to claim that the civil rights you speak of were conferred on the slaves of the Federal Union.

5. You deny my assertion that "individuals of the African race were voting members of several of the constituencies represented by those who drew up the Federal Constitution." My statement rests on the authority of Mr. Curtis, late Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. "At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation," says Mr. Curtis, "all free, native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of those States, but such of them as had the other neces-

sary qualifications possessed the *franchise of electors* on *equal terms* with other citizens." (P. 572, Report of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred Scott case, published by D. Appleton & Co.) He quotes the language of the statutes conferring the privilege. I have never seen any refutation of his statement. If such a refutation exists, I would thank you for directing my attention to it. In your assumption that my statement cannot be true because every State in the Union, excepting one, was a slave-holding State, I can see no logical connection between your premise and your conclusion. No argument is pertinent to your purpose except the disproof of the above statement, resting, as it does, on the authority of one of the most learned constitutional lawyers in the United States. All else seems to me mere speculative assumption, proving nothing for your argument, and nothing against mine.

6. I have either obscurely stated, or you have strangely misconceived, the purport of the question I proposed. If I were to say that, *other things being equal*, men exhale more carbonic acid than women, I would assert a fact; but the statement would not imply the assumption that men and women are equal; for, the absolute equality of the sexes once admitted, it would be incorrect to affirm that men exhale more carbonic acid than women. In my question, I do not assume that I believe in the absolute equality of the two races, or that it is necessary that *you* should believe in their equality. What I mean is this: Granting, either as the fact in the case, or, for the sake of the argument, that a native-born person of African descent possesses such qualifications—namely, that the said person is of the male sex, that he is of full age, that he is not a criminal, etc. etc.,—as are deemed necessary for the exercise of the elective franchise by a native-born person of the white race, what rational ground is there for not conceding his claim to the elective franchise which is not conclusive against the claim of a white man to the same privilege?

But, admitting, for the sake of the argument, that I do assume the African to be equal to the white race, I cannot see in what respect this assumption would render untenable any argument I have brought forward. The *onus probandi* in this discussion rests on you. You affirm that our National Constitution ignores the right of any member of the African race to the franchises of government. I deny the assertion, and call for the proof. Here the issue is clearly joined. It is your duty to bring forward the proof of your proposition.

7. It is your intention, you state, to hold me strictly to the question of right. I am willing to abide the judgment of the reader whether I have shirked any question legitimately belonging to this discussion.

You answer my question by laying down a postulate. If your postulate is incorrect, you certainly do not wish to hold me to it. If it is correct, I have syllogistically shown that the African race have the rights which you affirm our National Constitution ignores.

Very respectfully yours,

Nov. 20, 1858.

PUBLIUS.

REMARKS.—When our correspondent, PUBLIUS, asked us to explain to him the reason "why, other things being equal, a person of African descent, born in this country, has not as valid a claim to the privilege of the elective franchise?" we supposed he would confine himself to the question propounded. But, instead, the reader will perceive that he has rambled over the entire field of syllogistical reasoning, and instituted for *our* replication a dozen questions altogether irrelevant to the original interrogatory. The whole point in dispute is upon the *validity* of the colored man's *right* to the elective franchise. It does not require Justice Curtis or any other high functionary of law to decide the controversy, and we cannot see why PUBLIUS should select an isolated portion of the Dred Scott decision to justify his side of the issue, when we are satisfied he detests from his very heart the whole tenor of Curtis's position! We based our answer to the question of our correspondent upon constitutional grounds, and alluded to the Preamble of our Federal Constitution because that instrument is the fundamental basis of all our laws. The charter of *our* national liberties and elective prerogatives does *not*, and never *did*, recognize the African race as citizens of the United States, and, therefore, does *not*, and never *did*, authorize their *right* to the elective franchise. This fact has been again and again decided; for persons of African descent have, over and over again, applied to the proper authorities for *passports* to foreign countries, which applications have as often been *refused*, because of the *non-citizenship* of the applicants. Hence, the assertion of Judge Curtis, as quoted by PUBLIUS, that "at the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all *free*, native-born inhabitants of the States," etc., amounts to nothing—because we affirmed and do still affirm that *we have no right to go beyond the organic law of our land to adduce evidence substantiating the validity of their claims*. At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation the negro may have had *all* the social, moral, civil, and *legal* rights our correspondent claims; but the ratification of those Articles, which was *previous* to the adoption of our Constitution, put the seal of disfranchisement upon the descendants of the African race, the moment the event occurred. This explains the language found in the Fourth Article of that Confederation, which reads:—

"The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the *free inhabitants* of each of these States, paupers, *vagabonds*, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States."

Here is a complete repudiation of the citizenship of colored persons by the "Articles of the Confederation" themselves, the very instant they were

adopted and became the organic law of our Federal Union. And, as if to leave no doubt or misconception on the matter, Article Ninth further declares that the National Congress, under those Articles, shall "agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of *white inhabitants* in such State." Now, as the descendants of the African race had never participated in creating this country a "free and independent nation," and being of *inferior* blood, and incapacitated by nature for the rational enjoyment of *that* kind of freedom required by the superior descendants of the Caucasian race, our constitution-makers refused to give them the *rights* of suffrage. Had they been considered *citizens*, they would have been subjected to military duty as *white* men. If they were recognized as *citizens*, the "Articles of Confederation," as well as our Federal Constitution, and the Constitutions of the several States, allow them a privilege which is *not* given us, by exempting them from military duty and draft. Here is incontrovertible evidence that they never were, in a national sense, recognized as citizens of the United States, and their incompetency to become citizens, so far as constitutional legalities are concerned, has prevented them from exercising rights of elective franchise in all the States, except in a few instances, where they are permitted to vote on property qualifications against the authority of the General Government. Nearly all the State Constitutions confine the elective prerogatives to *white citizens*; those which do not employ the word *white* generalize the expression by using the term *citizens* or *inhabitants*, with the implied understanding that descendants of the African race are *not* citizens, because of their constitutional disqualifications. We have thus presented to PUBLIUS indisputable authority showing why the colored race have "not as *valid* a claim to the privilege of the elective franchise as the white man;" and, if he is unable to "see in what respect this assumption renders untenable" any of his arguments, it is *no* fault of ours. We are not responsible for his obtuseness, and we do not take upon ourselves the *onus probandi* of what our correspondent asserts. He asked us to answer a certain question—we have done so. We have no room to follow him in all his syllogisms, synecdoches, postulates, theorisms, hypothetical syncretisms, and other abstractions, and trust he will, in future, confine his remarks to the matter in question.

MR. BELISLE: DEAR SIR—If victory belongs to him who most dogmatically affirms, I shall leave you an uncontested field. I am now fully convinced that you cannot, or that you do not wish, to answer the interrogatory I propounded. You have not even attempted to refute more than one or two of the arguments I have brought forward in this discussion; and the sole mode of refutation you have adopted, where you have made the attempt, has been your unfailing resource—the *petitio principii*. My syllogisms have not even been assailed, much less overthrown. To say that these syllogisms are not pertinent to the question at issue is equivalent to affirming that the postulate they were designed to meet is not

pertinent to the question under discussion. According to your mode of reasoning, if the iteration of a proposition is not sufficient for its proof, its reiteration must establish its proof beyond all controversy. Now, as I am unable to consider assertion and argument terms of equivalent meaning, I shall close this discussion by examining, as briefly as I can, your rejoinder to my last communication, and thus give you whatever benefit you may derive from the last word.

1. You affirm that, instead of confining myself to the question I propounded, I have "rambled over the entire field of syllogistical reasoning, and instituted for *your* replication a dozen questions altogether irrelevant to the original interrogatory." I emphatically deny that I have asked one irrelevant question. You lay down a proposition. I ask for the proof. You consider my question irrelevant. What am I to infer? That its irrelevancy consists in your inability or determination not to answer it.

2. You say "the whole point in dispute is upon the *validity* of the colored man's *right* to the elective franchise." Very well; to prove that he had not this right, you assumed a postulate. I replied by adducing two syllogisms, based on your own premises, to show that the colored man has the right which you deny; yet you neither refuted my syllogisms nor abandoned your postulate. What am I to infer? That you are unable or unwilling to maintain your own ground.

3. "It does not," you state, "require Justice Curtis, or any other high functionary of law, to decide the controversy." This seems to me like a dodge to avoid being knocked down. I adduced a statement of Judge Curtis in support of a certain fact, which you denied. If the fact is as Justice Curtis asserts, I undertook to show that it is a contradiction in terms to affirm that those who drew up the Federal Constitution had the right to ignore rights which rested upon precisely the same basis whence the right of ignoring claimed by you can alone be assumed to be deducible. You have made no attempt to disprove the fact to be what Justice Curtis asserts, nor to meet the argument I based upon it, except by ringing the changes upon the proposition that "the charter of our national liberties and elective prerogatives does *not*, and never *did*, recognize the African race as citizens of the United States." How, I ask, is it the charter of *our* national liberties, in contradistinction to that of the liberties of *colored* persons, if, as I have said, colored persons were voting members of several of the constituencies represented by those who framed it? If you accept Justice Curtis's *fact*, this inquiry is overwhelming; if you do not accept it, please refute his statement.

4. To escape the difficulty which besets you, you now assert that the fact that colored persons are not citizens of the United States has been

again and again *decided*, inasmuch as they have repeatedly applied for, and been refused, passports to foreign countries. I knew that, before I commenced this discussion. I had read the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred Scott case before I had ever seen the "Camden Journal." One of the reasons why I propounded the inquiry which forms the basis of the present discussion was the utter inconclusiveness, to my mind, of the arguments on which that discussion rests. If you had stated, when I asked that question, that a decision adverse to the claim of a person of African descent to the elective franchise had already been pronounced by high authority, and that you heartily concurred in that opinion and had no wish to argue the questions involved in it, the discussion would not have commenced. But, according to your own admission, it does not require "any high functionary of law to decide the controversy between us;" therefore, I ask you to show me the constitutional warrant for the assumption that, because a person is of African descent, he is *ipso facto* not a citizen of the United States, and is therefore not entitled to a passport to a foreign country. I deny that there is such a warrant; and I challenge you to adduce any.

5. The "assertion of Justice Curtis," you state, "amounts to nothing, because we have affirmed, and still affirm, that *we have no right to go beyond the organic law of our land to adduce evidence substantiating the validity of their claims.*" This is decidedly cool. Justice Curtis supports my assertion, and disproves yours. If his authority is sound, colored persons have the rights which you deny. But it amounts to nothing, forsooth, because we have no right to go beyond the Constitution to establish the validity of their claim to the elective franchise! Again I ask—as I have before vainly asked—why, if we cannot go beyond that instrument, do you not show where, *in* that instrument, the claim of the *white race* to the elective franchise is specifically admitted, and that of *colored persons* specifically denied? No exclusive restriction of the elective franchise to the white race is found in the organic law of our land. If such restrictive clause exists, be kind enough to point it out. If it does not exist, why call the Constitution of the United States the charter of *our* national liberties any more than the charter of the national liberties of the *colored* man? Can you not answer that question?

6. "At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation," you say, "the negro may have had *all* the rights our correspondent claims; but the ratification of those Articles, which was *previous* to the adoption of our Constitution, put the seal of disfranchisement upon the descendants of the African race the moment the event occurred." How

the ratification of an Article conveying certain privileges and franchises is the repudiation of the privileges it conveys, is, I confess, quite beyond my comprehension; and it will be unkind of you to permit me to go unenlightened.

The Fourth of the Articles of Confederation you regard as a "complete repudiation of the citizenship of colored persons by the Articles of the Confederation themselves, the very instant they were adopted, and became the law of our Federal Union." This Article you quote as follows:—

"The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the *free inhabitants* of each of these States, paupers, *vagabonds*, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States."

Where, I ask, is the repudiation? *Colored* persons are not named in this Article. The clause simply says, *free* inhabitants, not free *white* inhabitants. Is the African the only race which furnishes *vagabonds* to the community? It is humiliating to be compelled to answer such bald, puerile, unsupported assertions when every reader of American history knows that this very Article was under consideration by the Continental Congress on the 25th of June, 1778, at which time the delegates from South Carolina moved to amend it by inserting after the word "free," and before the word "inhabitants," the word "white," so that the privileges and immunities of general citizenship would be secured only to white persons. Two States voted *for* the amendment; *eight* States *against* it; and the vote of one State was *divided*. To show that the citizenship of colored persons was clearly repudiated, you quote from the Ninth of the Articles of the Confederation, which requires the National Congress "to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of *white inhabitants* in such State." Your conclusion from this Article is utterly worthless against the emphatic and unequivocal interpretation given to the Fourth Article by the members of the Continental Congress themselves. But your argument proves entirely too much. If colored persons were *disfranchised* because the Continental forces were to be levied in proportion to the white inhabitants in each State, *women* and *children* were *entitled* to the elective franchise for the same reason.

7. Again you say, "Our Constitution-makers refused to give the descendants of the African race the rights of suffrage." In the name of all that is manly and honorable in dialectical warfare, please give us the chapter or clause in which that refusal is recorded.

You state that the exemption from military duty and draft of colored persons is incontrovertible proof that they were never recognized, in a national sense, as citizens of the United States. What *is* a citizen of a State, or of the United States? If the possession of the elective franchise is equivalent to citizenship, then colored persons, in five of the States under the old Confederation, had that privilege. The assertion that they were never citizens because they were exempted from military duty is not only contradicted by the fact that their citizenship is clearly established by the most unquestionable of tests, namely, the possession of the elective franchise, but it amounts to the assumption that the exemption of one class of persons in the community from duties devolving on others is *per se* equivalent to their disfranchisement; in which—pardon my obtuseness—I can see no connection between the premise and the conclusion.

The remainder of your rejoinder is merely naked, unsupported assertion, to which the term argument cannot be applied even by way of courtesy.

Your reverence for the *petitio principii* is quite oriental. "You have presented me," you say, "with indisputable authority showing why the colored race have not as valid a claim to the elective franchise as the white man." How did you show it? By affirming that the organic law of our land *expressly denies* their claim. I ask *where*? This question you consider irrelevant, and have not condescended to answer it. You say that I have not confined myself to the question in dispute, but you have scrupulously failed to show in what respect I have evaded it.

Hence, I am authorized in concluding that the *indisputable* authority you refer to is your own statement. With you the statement of a proposition seems to be the proof of it. If the assertion of a proposition will not produce conviction, you reassert it; and if the reassertion of it is unsuccessful, you charge an opponent with obtuseness. Now, this may be a very convenient mode of argumentation with you; but you must excuse me for regarding it as puerile to those who really wish to discuss a question fairly and manfully.

And now, with my best wishes for your health and prosperity, I leave the discussion with you, and with the reader who has been so kind as to accompany us.

Very truly yours,

PUBLIUS.

REMARKS.—The magnanimity of our esteemed correspondent, PUBLIUS, is exceedingly commendable. He has satisfied *himself* that all the arguments we have adduced to prove his *original* question are not sufficient for the purpose, and declares them of no account. We certainly thought we had given

him pretty strong and sound reasons, but it is, we must confess, hard work to *convince* a man *against* his will. When he asks us the question, "Why, other things being equal, a person of African descent, born in this country, has not as valid a claim to the privilege of the elective franchise as a white man?" we declare that it was because his *right* to the elective prerogative was not deducible from any organic law in reference thereto. In justification of this position, we cited the preamble to our Federal Constitution, where it is distinctly and unequivocally declared that the people of the United States sanctioned the Constitution as framed, for the purpose of providing "for the common defence," and of securing "the blessings of liberty to *ourselves and our posterity*." We showed that, in the convention which created that Constitution, there was *not* a solitary "person of African descent," consequently neither *they*, nor *their* descendants, who could have, under any possible construction of the sentence, been included within the meaning of the term to "secure the blessings of liberty to *ourselves and our posterity*." We further showed that the African race were *not* the offspring of the white race—that *we* are not *their* children, nor their progenitors. And having shown this very *plainly*, the inference was irresistible, that the delegates very wisely *ignored the citizenship of the African race*, though "born in this country;" therefore, their "claim to the privilege of the elective franchise" was denied from the commencement of our Federal Union. Hence, having *no claim*—even that of citizenship—there can be no *validity* of claim. To this our correspondent excepts, asserting that such logic is not pertinent to the issue. But, notwithstanding his varied researches in law matters and legal decisions, his views are directly antagonistic to those of Judge MacLean, who gave the first constitutional decision respecting the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, in the case of *Harvey Miller vs. George W. Querry*, and other high judicial authority. We prefer to go to the fountain head for decisive opinions; and, as we find the organic law of the land on our side of the question, we have chosen to invoke its aid in answering the question of our correspondent, rather than institute answers to the irrelevant interrogatories thrust at us, which grew out of technical assumptions on his part. We close the controversy, therefore, by asserting that—as the Negro has *no* citizenship, he is *not legally entitled to vote*, and therefore has *no "valid claim to the elective franchise."*

1858.

BROOKS AS A LEXICOGRAPHER.

To give a new word to our language is occasionally a proof of more than ordinary intellectual power. When it denotes an idea so distinctly novel that no existing word adequately represents it, such contribution is unquestionably a valuable addition to our intellectual stock. True, it is necessary to distinguish between two important classes of such words: namely, those which represent new ideas solely evolved from profound thinking; and those which happily express what otherwise would require detailed periphrasis. Those who construct, or those who suggest the use of, either class of words are, in a measure, entitled to the thanks of mankind.

In the category of those who have unintentionally rendered such service to humanity, we have no hesitation in giving a conspicuous place to PRESTON S. BROOKS. It is true that, by darkening the canvas of that fine historical picture in which posterity shall at once behold the glory and the shame of our noble country, he has brought out in immortal beauty the figure of the gentle, the learned, and the eloquent SUMNER. It is true that, like him who received immortality simply because of the wondrous magnificence of the Ephesian Temple, his celebrity will be due to the JOVE-like proportions of the living temple he sought to dishonor. These are advantages restricted to himself, and to that magnanimous constituency which he has so faithfully reflected. But the advantages we speak of are those which he has rendered to civilized mankind.

PRESTON S. BROOKS has added a word to our language; and for this he deserves our thanks. He has not, it is true, given us such a word as could be evolved only from patient and earnest reflection; for such thinking exists only in refined and cultivated society. Besides, his act was the most emphatic of protests against mental culture. The hatred which the Japanese exhibits towards the civilization of Western Europe is genial sentimentality when compared with his ineradicable disgust for all that widens the range of intellectual progress. Now, whether the sense of all verbs is derived from that of nouns is a question we leave to

philosophical grammarians. But that the sense of the verb *to Brooks* is derived from no other source than from PRESTON S. BROOKS, of South Carolina, we shall, against all odds, be prepared to maintain till our dying day. The only objection to this conclusion worth a moment's consideration is that so important a verb can be derived from so insignificant a noun. But this objection is more specious than sound. A worm is none the less a worm, though it founders the noblest vessel that cleaves the mighty deep. A rat is none the less a rat, though he gnaws the most valuable parchment that ever recorded a patent of nobility. To argue the non-existence of a ship or of a patent of nobility because of the vileness of the instruments to which their destruction is due, is equivalent to arguing that the Founder of our religion is not the Saviour of men because he was betrayed by JUDAS. The objection is therefore dismissed with contempt.

Now, the vast circumlocution which the verb *to Brooks* will enable us to economize is wonderful. To acquire the ability to express, by one word, all the disagreeable qualities which we can affirm of one act, is an augmentation of our stock of knowledge which a grateful man will only be too ready to admit. Hereafter, when we wish to assert that a given person, in a sneaking, stealthy manner, stepped up behind an innocent, unsuspecting, pre-occupied human creature, and beat him till he was senseless, we need only say that he *Brooksed* him, and our meaning is at once expressed. If we see a friend overcome in argument by the iron logic of an opponent, and we wish to extricate him from toils through which a rational man only knows how to work his way, we need only say, "*Brooks him!*" and our friend will know what is expected of him without a useless multiplicity of words. The advantages attending this mode of overcoming mental inequalities cannot be gainsaid, for it tends undoubtedly to equalize brains that would otherwise remain in interminable antagonism. Every one knows the meaning of *Burking*; no word in our language is its equivalent. The word *Brooksing* will hereafter prove equally indispensable. We now submit our definition.

To Brooks, a verb transitive (a word derived from PRESTON S. BROOKS, of South Carolina, who stealthily entered the Senate Chamber of the United States, and assaulted with a bludgeon CHARLES SUMNER, and beat him until he was senseless); to assail free speech by means of the bludgeon; stealthily to creep up behind an unarmed man, and beat him till he is senseless; to assail an opponent in a brutal, ruffianly, and cowardly manner; to overcome, by brute force, one whose arguments you cannot refute, whose facts you cannot controvert; to attack an innocent person in an unusually mean and dastardly way.

This word may not at once find its way into the standard dictionaries of our language. Nor did the word *Burking*. But the necessities of composition are inexorable, and a word that so felicitously condenses the meaning of a paragraph cannot legitimately escape that universal use which no genuine lexicographer will dare to disregard.

A FORGOTTEN SPECIFICATION.

Mr. Hosmer:—

On the complaint of Rev. T. J. Quigley, your readers are aware, Rev. J. D. Long is to be tried at the forthcoming session of the Philadelphia Annual Conference for unchristian and unministerial conduct. The following is the enumeration of the specifications:—

1. Misrepresenting the Philadelphia Annual Conference.
2. Misrepresenting the people of Maryland and Delaware.
3. Misrepresenting the preachers who have labored in Maryland and Delaware.
4. Misrepresenting the members of the Church.
5. Misrepresenting the colored people.

To these specifications we suggest the addition of the following:—

6. Misrepresenting the Dogs of Maryland and Delaware.

The complement of specifications would thus seem to be complete; and we therefore respectfully commend it to the attention of the Rev. Mr. Quigley. A dog, it is admitted, is but a dog; yet, like all sentient beings, he has a claim to some consideration on the part of mankind. To belie him is to lessen his chances for protection and support. In proof of this observation, we appeal to the well-known proverb: "Give a dog a bad name, and hang him."

The dog has noble characteristics; and to weaken our respect for these by disparaging statements concerning his actions and habits is to do him injustice; and no true Christian would do injustice to the meanest of God's creatures.

Fiat justitia, ruat cælum. He has physical courage, and mankind holds this quality in deservedly high estimation. He has not moral courage, it is true, for that is predicable of rational beings alone; but he is not thence to be depreciated, for multitudinous bipeds lack the same quality. If Providence has withheld certain attributes from him, it has, in its compensative provisions, furnished him with others which we do not possess at all, or possess only in a very limited degree. The dog is never a

flunkey or a toady. He never fawns at the footstool of power, for he is equally obedient to the master and the slave; and herein the canine has an advantage over the human race, which too often

"Crooks the pliant hinges of the knee that thrift may follow fawning."

The very worst thing you can say of him is, that the royal road to his affections lies through his belly.

But what saith Peter Pindar?—

"The royal road to human hearts, you'll find,
Is through the guts, or I mistake mankind."

He is, it is true, satisfied with his condition, and never indicates his dissatisfaction with the evils that surround him. But if this self-complacency reveals an ignoble disposition we might, if we should look sharply, perceive slight traces of such a disposition in a race of animals of far higher grade.

Again: a noble dog, like all noble animals, never vexes and oppresses a poor, sick, weakly member of his race. Oh, no! He seeks a foe worthy of his prowess. A noble *man*, *a fortiori*, never oppresses a feeble brother—a truism which might seem trite, were it not so frequently overlooked. For the quality we have mentioned, *some* dogs will bear favorable comparison with some members of our own race.

For these reasons, we conceive it to be our duty to stand up for our canine friends against all undiscerning disparagement; and we furthermore conceive it to be our unquestioned right to insist that any one who stands forward, self-commissioned, to describe the boundaries beyond which it shall hereafter be considered unchristian and unministerial to express opinions on given subjects, shall not be oblivious of the claims to consideration and respect of *any* creature, however insignificant, whose status will be directly or indirectly affected by opinions which, with equal practicability, may be subjected to the same salutary censorship.

To do otherwise, would be a violation of the Golden Rule. Lest the motive last assigned for the discharge of a clear and unequivocal duty might seem to Mr. Quigley too exacting—inasmuch it has proved signally inefficacious when appealed to in behalf of creatures far worthier of his notice, we hasten to place the duty on practical grounds: When Mr. Long was in Maryland his canine inhabitants were among *his* constituents. All is changed. This constituency is now represented by Mr. Quigley; and to be untrue to it would prove him to be a faithless representative of its interests. These interests have been assailed. The fact cannot be gainsaid. Shall we furnish the proof?

"There is as much difference," says Mr. Long, "between a genuine

negro dog, and a gentleman's dog, as there is between an oyster-cart horse, and an Arabian charger." "His tail is cut midway, and his ears are cropped." When the master's spaniel approaches him, he "skulks to one side." "If the spaniel attacks him he makes no resistance; he falls flat on the ground, turns on his back, curves his cut tail between his legs, and appeals to the magnanimity of his master's dog, and says by actions, Oh, don't! I am but a poor slave of a slave!"

Now this specious and sophistical depreciation of the character of the dog may be the first link in a chain of events big with disaster to many of his race. It may be the means of withholding from him many opportunities which he might otherwise have enjoyed of rising, agreeably to his due position, in a scale of canine precedence. It may be the means of depressing his energies to a point below even their present humble development.

1. The affirmation that a dog, when thus attacked by his master's spaniel, will assume a dorsal position while his tail will describe the arc of a circle around his abdomen, is clearly inadmissible, for the sufficient reason that it would indicate a degree of humility equal to the mental prostration of many members of a higher race not a thousand miles from his habitat; and that is inconceivable. The statement cannot, therefore, be regarded as trustworthy.

"His tail is cut midway; and his ears are cropped." The first clause of this description reveals sufficient faultiness of observation to justify us in casting discredit on the assertion. Mr. Long does not state whether the tail is cut in its transverse, or in its longitudinal axis. This is a determinable question, and, as we are not bound to accept any statement liable to two different interpretations, we may be excused for holding *sub judice* our opinions on the matter until further developments are made. At all events, the dog has the benefit of the doubt.

2. Moreover, the assertion that the tails of the negro's dogs are cut at all ought to rest on unequivocal induction. Mr. Long has not seen *all* the dogs of all the slaves in Maryland and Delaware. No statistics reveal to us their exact number; and when we bear in mind how many dogs are conceived and born, mature and die, in the interval which separates one decennial period from another, nothing but the faintest approximation to a knowledge of the real facts in the case is presumable; yet there is no qualification in Mr. Long's language. He makes no exception to the rule; and the reliability of his testimony on the subject may hence well be doubted.

3. The dog, says Mr. Long, *seems* to say by his actions, "Oh, don't!" Seems to *whom*? Why, to Mr. Long. This seeming is suspicious. Darkened and jaundiced by the murky atmosphere around him, his

perceptions must have been indistinct; or, at all events, his impressions must have been tinged by the hue of surrounding conditions. Mr. Quigley would have regarded the matter with different eyes.

It is mean, by gratuitous implications and reflections, to restrict a poor dog's range of enjoyments, as would undoubtedly be the case, were his normal status among his race inferrable from such representations of his conduct—which representations, as we have shown, rest upon the flimsiest of grounds.

If every bad as well as every good word we utter acts and reacts, for all that we know to the contrary, to all eternity, it is demonstrable that the consequences of such misrepresentation can never be adequately appreciated.

To this description of the negro dog's condition may be due, in the mind of another man, a grave misconception; and from such misconception may follow the dog's consignment to a position which debars him from the immunities of a dog who, because he belongs to the slave's master, is never to be presumed so far to forget his dignity as unconsciously to form across his umbilical region, by means of his caudal appendage, the segment of a circle. Whatever mentality such auspicious circumstances might have produced would, through this misconception, lie hopelessly in abeyance. But this is not all. The manifestation of this supposed mentality would create ideas in our own minds; unmanifested, the ideas would be uncreated; *ergo*, these ideas must be regarded as hopelessly lost. The gravity of the case is still further augmented by the fact that the ideas thus created by the dog's culture would suggest to our mind other ideas, which in turn would suggest still others, and thus might have originated trains of thinking which our imagination, in its loftiest flight, would fruitlessly attempt to circumscribe. To think that by thoughtless disparagement of one member of the brute creation, so much thinking should forever remain undeveloped! What a conception!

A dog, if he is but a dog, is entitled to justice. That justice, as we have shown, Mr. Long has not accorded to him. If he that would steal a lamb would steal a sheep, it follows that he that would misrepresent a dog would, *a fortiori*, misrepresent a man. Now to defend men from misrepresentation is to carry coals to New Castle; for they can defend themselves. It is the part of true magnanimity to speak for those who cannot speak for themselves. We trust that Mr. Quigley, after giving the subject the consideration due to his own reputation, and to the gravity of the occasion, will not fail to appreciate the exigency which requires him to hurry up the charge.

MASTIFF.

PHILADELPHIA, March 19, 1858.

AN AIM IN LIFE.

A STEADFAST purpose to be, or to do anything is usually so sure an indication that we shall accomplish what we seek, that, the purpose once formed, our success may be considered already more than half attained. Everything really worthy the attention of mankind has its price; and the price of eminent distinction in any department either of active or intellectual life is a constant devotion to the pursuit of our choice. But a wise man is careful to select that field which will yield him the most abundant fruit. "It is an uncontrolled truth," says Dean Swift, "that no man ever made an ill figure in the world who understood his own talents, nor a good one who mistook them." Had Sir Isaac Newton cultivated poetry with as much assiduity as he cultivated the sciences, and had Milton neglected poesy for the mathematics, the probability is that the world would have never seen either the "Principia" or the "Paradise Lost." So conscious was either where his strength lay that we have not the smallest doubt that each foresaw his immortality with a prescience almost akin to inspiration.

Hence, whether our talents be one or ten, we shall leave our mark on the society in which we live just in proportion as they are patiently cultivated and skilfully directed. The reader will pardon the triteness of this observation, if he will recall to mind how numerous are the instances which suggest its statement. We are frequently pointed, with a feeling of contempt, to the *éclat* which surrounds the name of a person of mean intellect. Yet it not unfrequently happens that the very *éclat* which provokes our contempt has resulted from a degree of concentration of mind which it would have been well for us to imitate. Talent may have been given with a sparing hand; but how careful and assiduous its culture! In such cases, the one idea is ever uppermost in the mind. It often absorbs every other. And a very wise man may quite unconsciously pay a heavy tribute to rear the cunningly wrought fabric; though he is of course in blissful ignorance that he does so.

A man with one talent may attain a goal which will elude the eager grasp of a man with ten talents. Like the tortoise in the fable, he goes

straight forward to his object. The other stops to sleep by the way, and wakes to find his competitor the winner. But let us never aim at anything which is beneath the dignity of a wise man's mark. We may expend as much physical energy in chasing the gossamer that floats along the meadow as in reaping a field of grain. Yet, without labor, no really useful purposes or solid enjoyments are attainable. The true philosophy of life consists in so directing the application of our physical and intellectual resources that we may, with the least expenditure of material, realize the amplest gain. To do this consciously and intelligently is to have what we call an *aim* in life. And the aim will be a good or a bad one according as our motives are disinterested and pure, or dishonest and selfish; according as our guiding impulse is cunning, or that which seeks the greatest good of the greatest number.

To have an aim in life, reader, is your duty, because thereby you can most efficiently discharge the obligations you owe to your Father in Heaven, and to your fellow-man. Recollect, that good as well as bad habits may be acquired. A dull subject will be rendered attractive where the attention is continued and earnest, not spasmodic and dilatory. To give this attention, much less labor is required than the uninitiated suppose. Even the fatigue which it produces is overshadowed by the advantages which we very soon feel that it affords. The horizon soon begins to clear, and a serene and lofty pleasure ushers in with the dawn. Labor then becomes pastime. We feel that we are beginning to live a new life, and yearn for a more invigorating atmosphere.

When we think of the hours wasted by so many of our young friends, we feel a pang of regret which words cannot describe. They appear to forget that the intellectual man yields to none in his keen relish for really salutary social enjoyments. Yet how hard it is for them to devote one poor hour to study! as though the time thus spent were so much abstracted from the aggregate of pleasures which life affords. To be a diligent student, to give your heart and mind to the acquisition of useful knowledge, it is no more necessary that you should be a recluse than it is necessary that, to be a religious man, you should be morose and unapproachable. Instead of diminishing, it will augment the pleasures of intercourse with your fellow-men. And a systematic devotion to intellectual pursuits is by no means incompatible with the amplest leisure. The most intellectual man, the deepest thinker whom we have the honor of knowing has an abundance of time at his command which excited our astonishment until we reflected that repose quickens and intensifies a mind which is unwaveringly concentrated on a given object. A mind fortified by years of patient culture unbends, like the unstrung bow, only to augment its efficiency.

Our readers, we trust, will pardon this grave homily, for it is offered with an earnest purpose and a true heart. That you may realize for yourselves how great a gain may result from a little labor, we propose the following innocent experiment: We will suppose that you have little or no taste for intellectual pursuits. How, then, shall you acquire this taste, assuming the acquisition to be useful? With what department of knowledge would you wish to be acquainted? Let us suppose that it is Grammar. Now take Cardell's English Grammar, and read it carefully for half an hour. At the expiration of that time, put down the book. If you do not understand it, you have at least done half an hour's thinking. Take it up the next day, or evening, and read it for half an hour; then put it down. The day following, continue the study—mark, only for half an hour. Repeat the study the next day—the next—and the next: for a week—a month; for three months. At the end of that time you will have done nearly fifty hours of thinking.

What will be the result? Compare your stock of ideas on English grammar at the commencement with your stock of ideas at the close of the three months, and you will see at once that the acquisition has been marvellous. Labor will soon become a pleasure. Take history, take the mathematics; the result will be the same, for thinking in all cases is the same, how different soever may be the objects to which it is applied.

Let our young friends make this experiment. It will do them no harm. It will not detract aught from their enjoyments; and it *may* open to them sources of usefulness and happiness where, as in Milton's "divine philosophy," no "crude surfeit reigns."

PROGRESS.

EXTREMES occasionally meet. The PHILADELPHIA CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE, and the New York CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE AND JOURNAL, occupy theoretically different positions relative to ecclesiastical progress. Practically, however, the two journals are beginning to approximate. And every thinker knows that theory and practice are inseparably blended. "It is hard," said the great Apostle to the Gentiles, "to kick against the pricks." This figure merely symbolizes the absurdity, as well as difficulty, of resisting those principles whose progress is an unavoidable sequence of their existence. "It is in vain," said Pascal, in writing to the Jesuits, "that you have obtained a decree from Rome condemning Galileo's doctrine concerning the motion of the earth. That decree will not suffice to prove that the earth does not move; and if constant observation proves the fact of its motion, all the men in the world cannot hinder its revolution, nor help themselves from turning round with it." The application of this fine observation of the amiable and witty Port Royalist is obvious. It is quite easy to set our face against the current of the times. It is not so easy to prevent ourselves from moving along with the current against which we set our face, for the simple reason that we constitute an integral part of the stream whose progress we oppose. Hence, whether we stubbornly resist, or wisely aid, the advancing element, the result is to a great extent the same; for, headforemost or feetforemost, down the tide we go, and *must* go; some at a slower, some at a faster rate than others, according as we seek the channel, or lazily float in shallow water. We do not believe that a human being has ever lived who has escaped the influence of the circumstances by which he has been surrounded. The true test of progress, however, is not always measurable by the degree we have advanced in a given direction, but by the degree in which our eye is concentrated in a given direction. Wickliffe was a step in advance of the Languedocian reformers; but the eyes of those reformers were fixed in the true direction. Luther was in advance of Wickliffe; yet the gaze of the great English reformer was directed *toward* the shining mark. If the

face of a Christian is Zion-ward, he moves *toward* Zion. Where the heart is unflinching and trustingly fixed on the prize of the noblest of callings, we verily believe that even its errors tend to their own correction.

The bearing of these remarks the reader will easily see if he will carefully scan the production of "Alethinos" on our fourth page. The appearance of this article in the CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE AND JOURNAL does honor to the head and heart of its venerable editor. It shows that, in his advanced years, his heart beats with genuine republican feeling. Politically, his eye looks forward; ecclesiastically, it looks backward. In the present case, his heart, as though it were on a pivot, has veered round, and given the ecclesiastical elements a truly republican direction. When we bear in mind the fact that Dr. Bond has been for the last thirty-five years the most influential layman in the M. E. church; that to him have been confided, *by the itinerancy themselves*, the care of their interests in the hour of prosperity, and the defence of these interests in the hour of danger; that the learning, the talent, and the tact of this ecclesiastical "child" have been wielded with such effect that he may be justly styled the Champion of the Itinerancy; that the uplifted lash of his satire and ridicule has made even the *divinely* appointed ministers of our church to tremble in their shoes;—and when we also bear in mind the fact that the same ecclesiastical "child," who, in a trying emergency, was retained as counsel *by* the itinerancy, to do the thinking of the itinerancy, *for the benefit* of the itinerancy, and who, though a child when considered in relation to the enactment of Methodist Episcopal law, is every inch a man when we view him in relation to the defence of a system which makes a child of him governmentally, now steps forward to publish so extraordinary an article as that of "Alethinos," we confess to a feeling of profound gratitude for so striking an illustration of the axiom that the world does move. The circumstance suggests this significant fact—that, had not the editor of our New York contemporary been a layman, the article in question would never have appeared in its columns. Another proof, by the way, of the wisdom of the plan which secures the effective co-operation of the laity in all the branches of ecclesiastical government, legislative, judicial, and administrative.

We defy any layman or clergyman to show us so *radical* an article in any Methodist journal ever printed in these United States or elsewhere. It hits all that Dr. Bond has written on the subject of lay delegation for the last thirty-five years in the very "apple of the eye." It strikes the theory which has been dragging its slow length along in the communications of Dr. Hodgson right between "wind and water." It

convicts W. H. B. of fulsome laudation and arrogant adulation of the papal principle. It shifts the question disputed by Dr. Hodgson and our esteemed friend W. H. B. to a point far behind that which has been the subject of so much noisy and pompous declamation on their part. Neither Dr. Hodgson nor W. H. B. has forgotten the difficulty with which the advocates of the papal principle encountered the unanswerable query of Chillingworth! How, granting the claim of a church to be infallible, shall we infallibly *know* it to be infallible? A question analogous to this, but one which both Dr. Hodgson and W. H. B. have, with praiseworthy caution, most pertinaciously avoided, is: How, granting the fact that the apostles, and their fellow-ministers, exclusive of laymen, were invested by Christ with supreme ecclesiastical power, does Dr. Hodgson prove the transfer of the power which the apostles and their fellow-ministers possessed, to himself, and other clergymen, as contradistinguished from laymen? In other words, will either Dr. Hodgson or W. H. B. answer the query propounded some time since by "A Retired Thinker:" What is the *characteristic* of a "divinely" appointed teacher?

We trust our readers will carefully peruse the article of "Alethinos." It is based on the Protestant principle—a principle as indestructible as the constitution of the human mind. A little thinking will do them no harm. And if they practice it as consistent *Protestant* Christians ought to practice it, they will, we humbly hope, finally arrive at the conclusion that they can do their own ecclesiastical thinking quite as well as their own political thinking.

VERBAL CRITICISM.

UNTIL within a few weeks we had believed that moderate skill in verbal criticism was a respectable attainment, and that the exhaustive analysis of some single terms was among the most difficult problems that the mind could propose to itself. We are now taught otherwise by an authority that it might seem presumptuous to disregard. In a notice of *Vulgarisms and Other Errors of Speech*, by Mr. Richard Meade Bache, lately published by Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, of this city, the literary critic of the *Nation* says:—

"This book is open to the objections which may be brought against most books that treat of errors of speech. It is sound enough whenever the particular error it is dealing with is a perfectly obvious one; but when the point discussed is really difficult, we find a failure in knowledge and acumen. Of old it was known as a trick of the race of commentators to avoid the shaky places in their path, and to build vast bridges across tracts where, without any of their help, we all could have passed dry-shod, or which we all could have avoided. Especially is this likely to be true of verbal commentators, who so often are such because they are men ungifted with the powers of mind, and incapable of attaining the degree of information requisite to the handling of topics more weighty and universally interesting. Yet, as language is nothing but as it is the instrument and expression of thought, it is plain that an unlearned or feeble-minded man must be but a bad critic of words."

As an antidote to this specious depreciation of verbal criticism, we commend to the reader the sententious utterance of Lord Bacon, in the *Advancement of Learning*: "Although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well—*loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes*, yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment."

We think that the *Nation* should furnish an approximate explanation of the proposition that the incapacity to attain the degree of information requisite to the handling of weightier topics is the reason that men often become verbal commentators. Weightier than what? The critic does not tell us. The antecedent is "verbal commentators." Were we

not restrained by the fear of placing ourselves hopelessly in the ranks of the mentally ungifted, we should say that the antecedent which he meant to refer to was verbal topics, or words; and that the use of the comparative "*more weighty*" implies that words are a *weighty* topic of study. The critic furnishes no scale of precedence whereby the relative intellectual power requisite to handle given questions is deducible. The assumption that a verbal commentator is feeble-minded is a *petitio principii*.

"Of old," says the critic, "it was known as a trick of the race of commentators to avoid the shaky places in their path, and to build vast bridges across tracts where, without any of their help, we all could have passed dry-shod, or which we all could have avoided." Granted for the sake of the argument: the perpetual manifestation of the trick to avoid shaky places would seem to be an irresistible consequence, because he who should seek to detect them, and to place us dry-shod across them, must become *ipso facto* one of the race of commentators, with whom, says the critic, it is a trick to avoid the shaky places. But does it follow that, because the commentator is unable to put us across shaky places dry-shod, we who are not commentators understand all that he may wish to communicate to us concerning places that are not hopelessly shaky? The assumption that it does involves, to our mind, begging the critic's pardon, a *non distributio medii*. If, before reading their commentaries, we are all assumed to be able to acquire, "without any of their help," all that the commentators wish to impart to us, what function do knowledge and acumen, rather than ignorance and dulness, subserve in verbal criticism? for *all* is a generic term, which includes the feeble-minded as well as the wise.

"*Especially*," says the critic, "is this likely to be true of verbal commentators." What is especially likely to be true? Namely, this—to avoid the shaky places in their path. Why? Because verbal commentators often are such from the fact that they are men ungifted with the powers of mind to handle "*weightier topics*." But the critic has just told us that we all, gifted and ungifted, could, "without any of their help," do all that the race of commentators could do. Were we replying to a critic less astute than he of the *Nation*, we would take the liberty of suggesting that the assumption that there is a special proclivity of the mentally ungifted to do what all of us, wise or unwise, are assumed to do without limitation as to degree, is a contradiction in terms.

Says the critic: "*Yet as* language is nothing *but as* it is the expression of thought, it is plain that an unlearned or feeble-minded man must be *but* a bad critic of words." The italicising is ours. What

relation does the word "*yet*" bear to the preceding proposition or propositions? Coleridge tells us that a close reasoner may be known by the pertinent use of his connectives.

Unless we sadly fail to understand our critical friend, his reasoning runs thus: All commentators avoid shaky places; we all *ex necessitate* avoid shaky places; but the verbal critic especially avoids them, because he is often a comparatively feeble-minded member of the "race of commentators;" nevertheless, we all, gifted or ungifted, are equally prone to avoid them; *still*, a "feeble-minded" man must be a bad critic of words because language is an instrument of thought. This ratiocination, we have no doubt, is very profound to those who depreciate verbal criticism; but we are among those who claim to have some respect for a knowledge of words, and therefore would commend to our critic the counsel which John Stuart Mill gives to the young metaphysician—namely, to "be always sure what he means by his particles. A large portion of all that confuses metaphysical thought comes from a vague use of those small words." It was in relation to Locke's examination of these small words that Horne Tooke quotes the pregnant illustration of Dean Swift: "When the water is clear, you will easily see to the bottom."

But the reasoning of our critic is quite as original as it is profound: Language is nothing but the instrument of thought, therefore a feeble-minded man must be a bad critic of words: a man is ungifted with the powers of mind to handle "*weightier topics*;" therefore, he is a verbal commentator, *i. e.*, a critic of words. Accordingly, he must be a good critic of words who uses words which do not express thought, and he must be a bad verbal critic who uses words which express thought. We are thus constrained to reverse the memorable dictum of Hobbes that "words are the counters of wise men, and the money of fools," and say that "words are the money of wise men, and the counters of fools." Now, this is distasteful mental pabulum, and were it offered to us by anybody less gifted than he who wields the literary sceptre of the *Nation*, we should feel utterly disinclined to bolt it!

VERBAL CRITICISM.

THE *Bad English* of Mr. George W. Moon is devoted to the exposure of grammatical errors assumed to be contained in Lindley Murray's *Grammar*, as well as in a series of articles contributed to *The Nation* by Hon. George P. Marsh, and in Mr. Edward S. Gould's *Good English*. It indicates considerable acuteness, and shows us what a plentiful crop of errors awaits the gathering of a patient reaper in the field of verbal criticism.

In a notice of this work, *The Nation* says:—

"No literary business ranks lower than this verbal criticism."

The reader will please bear in mind that the Essays of Mr. Marsh, which were entitled "Notes on the New Edition of Webster's Dictionary," consisted, in the language of their author, "of a series of miscellaneous observations on the character, composition, and sources of the English language;" and that they were introduced by the editor to the readers of *The Nation* as follows:—

"We believe they will be found the most valuable and entertaining criticism which that work has yet elicited, and we commend them especially for perusal and preservation to the scholars and the whole corps of instructors of the country."

He will thus be enabled to estimate at their full value the consistency and delicate grace with which such depreciation comes from such a source. When Mr. Marsh assumes the office of critic, verbal criticism becomes respectable. The essential insignificance of verbal criticism becomes apparent only when the critic is criticised.

Words are inseparable from literary business, and literary business is well or ill performed according to the degree in which it embodies or fails to embody their correct use. Other things being equal, a person who writes correctly will write with more grace and elegance than one who writes incorrectly. There may be correctness without elegance of diction; but there cannot be elegance of diction without correctness. Accord-

ingly, any skilful attempt to point out the quicksands which beset the pathway of the most wary of writers deserves the warm thanks of every one who seeks to attain accuracy in the use of language.

"Verbal criticism," says *The Nation*, "should be practised as quietly and unpretentiously as possible, as if the critic fully realized how much more important things there were to be attended to."

It follows, we presume, that the right to be noisy and pretentious is affirmable of those only who are interested in subjects which rank higher than verbal criticism in a scale of precedence known only to the literary editor of *The Nation*. Until this scale is furnished us, that we may test its rationality, we shall be constrained to graduate our noise and pretentiousness in accordance with our conceptions of the importance which any literary business we undertake has relatively to that of any literary business we might undertake.

This depreciation of verbal criticism scarcely deserves to be designated as sophistical, for the term sophistication is applied to that which has the form, even though it lacks the substance, of sound reasoning. A morbid antipathy to venture beyond the precincts of mere affirmation is not unfrequently a characteristic of intellectual feebleness; and assuredly no motive less potent than the fear of being regarded as noisy and pretentious could have tempted us to swerve from the duty of making a signal application of so plain a proposition.

Having thus happily shown verbal criticism to be unworthy of the attention of any man who claims to have a moderate degree of intellectuality, our friend unconsciously nullifies what he has said by becoming himself a verbal critic; for how can any man, who does not verbally criticise, be affirmed to be able to declare the style of a work on verbal criticism to be correct? What is style but the form of a collocation of words relative to that of another collocation of words? Accordingly, to be a judge of style, a person must be familiar with words in their individual meanings, and in their relations one to another. This familiarity the editor of *The Nation* assumes to have, for he pronounces the style of Mr. Moon to be *very* correct. But the functions of a verbal judge ill become him. Why the qualifying term "*very*?" That which is susceptible of correction is not correct. This truism seems too patent to require comment. If our friend means to say that Mr. Moon, in his *Bad English*, does not, in any instance, err against his own dicta, or against the principles of sound verbal criticism, he shall not be our guide, how quiet and unpretentious soever he may choose to be.

Mr. Moon tells us (p. 26) that redundancy of language is ungrammatical. If that is so, the first sentence of his work is ungrammatical:—

"Of *all* the tasks of our school-days, perhaps none was more repugnant to any of us than the study of grammar."

The italicised word is superfluous, as the editor of *The Nation* might easily have seen, if he had inverted the order of the words in the sentence, thus:—

"Perhaps *none* of the tasks of our school-days," etc.

In the following sentences, all the italicised words are redundant:—

"An error, the *exact* reverse of that just referred to," etc. (p. 34.)

"Such errors are more 'instructive than any number of examples of good English could *possibly* be.'" [This is very bad. *Could* denotes possibility verbalized.] (p. 4.)

"These are, certainly, remarkable errors for an author to commit when *actually* writing on the improprieties of the English language." (p. 29.)

"Nothing in *connection with* Mr. Marsh's Notes so much surprises me as his misuse of words." (p. 107.)

Mr. Moon speaks of the "living thoughts of the author's *mind*." (p. 51.) Of what, pray, except the mind, is thought predicable?

Mr. Moon condemns the following sentence as ungrammatical because "are" is omitted before "any rules and examples:—"

"A proper selection of faulty composition is more instructive than any rules and examples"!

But a conclusive refutation of his assumption we give in his own words:—

"When we find any ellipsis in a writer's sentence, it behooves us not to be dogmatical in our assertions [to what but 'assertions' does the word 'dogmatical' apply?] as to what words he has omitted; nor ought we to accuse him of inaccuracy because his sentence, *according to our filling up of it*, is ungrammatical, when there is another way of filling it up; and [when?] according to *that* filling up [of it?] the language will be found to be correct." (p. 223.)

The italics are his own. A more significant illustration of contradictory teaching is rarely seen.

That a writer's words should express his meaning is, without doubt, the supreme law of composition. Within a paragraph or two of that in which the assumed error from Lindley Murray is pointed out, there occurs the following sentence:—

"If the reader will carefully examine this passage, he will see that the nominative to the verb, '*have ever been*,' is in the singular number; and therefore the verb should have been in the singular." (p. 5.)

Here the omission of the word *that* before "therefore" gives to the sentence a meaning which the author did not intend. The affirmation is that the verb is required to be in the singular because *the reader will see* that the nominative to the verb is in the singular number; whereas the truth of the proposition is not dependent on any such contingency. The propositions meant to be affirmed are, that the nominative to the verb is singular, and that, *because* of that circumstance—namely, that the nominative is in the singular—the verb should be in the singular.

The following sentence, as well as the one which we have just criticised, might be selected as a favorable text to illustrate radical faultiness in the construction of a sentence, and to test the skill of a youthful writer in composition:—

"So faulty is the construction of this sentence, that, besides the '*and which*' error in it, the relative adverb '*therefore*,' that follows those words, has really not any antecedent that is grammatically connected with it." (p. 22.)

What are the grammatical relations of the clause "besides the '*and which*' error?" Mr. Moon *means* to say that the sentence from Lindley Murray is faulty in two respects: First, because it contains the "*and which*" error. Secondly, because the relative adverb which follows these words has no antecedent which is grammatically connected with it. But mark what he *says*: The relative adverb "*therefore*" has really not any antecedent which is grammatically connected with it *besides* [in addition to] the "*and which*" error in the sentence!

What is the antecedent of the word *this*, in the following sentence?

"They omit the pronoun in sentences where its presence is really necessary to the grammatical arrangement of the words. *This* has been done by Lindley Murray, on page 305. He there says," etc. (p. 24.)

This *what*? How much better it is to say: "An instance of its omission occurs in the work of Lindley Murray, who, on page 305, says," etc.

The following sentence is very faulty:—

"The word consonant . . . is a noun or name of certain letters of the alphabet." (p. 98.)

Why not say: "The word consonant is a noun, and *the* name of certain letters of the alphabet"?

The omission we have indicated renders the following sentence ungrammatical:—

"From the consideration of Lindley Murray's errors in the use of verbs, let us now turn to [that of?] his errors in the use of adverbs." (p. 11.)

Mr. Moon says :—

"It is evident that all Lindley Murray's study . . . did not teach him to speak accurately." (p. 30.)

If the commission of several verbal errors is correctly assumed to render nugatory the authority of a given grammarian, assuredly the *Bad English* of Mr. Moon must be pronounced a grammatical failure.

But we cannot imitate the equanimity of our author when speaking of Mr. E. S. Gould :—

"When a would-be critic of my language is unable to see the faults in his own, I smile at the expression of his benevolent intentions ; and, while thanking him very cordially for his proffered services, decline to place myself under his tuition." (p. 67.)

Despite the grammatical peccability of Mr. Moon, we confess our indebtedness to him—an indebtedness which, had his modesty and reverence borne any just proportion to his acumen, would, without doubt, have been much augmented.

Unlike *The Nation*, we welcome such volumes as that of *Bad English*. We regard their increase in the light in which a great philosopher regarded the multiplication of books in general : "There seemeth to be a superfluity of books : but shall no more books be made ? Ay, make good books, which, like the rod of Moses, shall devour the serpents of the enchanters."

1869.

MACAULAY.

IN an article in the *London Quarterly Review* for April, 1868 entitled "Lord Macaulay and his School," the writer says :—

"The judgment of foreign nations may be accepted as a tolerably fair sample of the judgment of posterity. Already, both on the Continent and in the United States, Lord Macaulay is almost always quoted with qualification or reserve."

Even conceding the correctness of this dictum, one of the illustrations brought forward in its support we consider as inadmissible. In a literary sense, the American people can scarcely be regarded with truth as a foreign nation in relation to the countrymen of Macaulay. Given an equal degree of mental power, culture, industry, and impartiality, the judgments of Americans and Englishmen concerning the ultimate intellectual standing of each other seem to us to be substantially of equal weight. In the recognition of this fact lies, we think, the sting of the rebuke which Macaulay administered, many years ago, to certain English tourists of Tory proclivities :—

"Mr. Southey," he says, "never speaks of the people of the United States with that pitiful affectation of contempt by which some members of his party have done more than wars or tariffs can do to excite mutual enmity between two communities formed for mutual friendship. Great as the faults of his mind are, paltry spite like this has no place in it. Indeed, it is scarcely conceivable that a man of his sensibility and his imagination should look without pleasure and national pride on the vigorous and splendid youth of a great people, whose veins are filled with our blood, whose minds are nourished with our literature, and on whom is entailed the rich inheritance of our civilization, our freedom, and our glory."

So utterly out of proportion is the literary nutriment we return the mother country in exchange for what we get, that it is difficult to see what specific value, other things being equal, there is in the "qualification" or "reserve" with which an American, in contradistinction to an Englishman, quotes an author whose reputation looms so grandly above that of common authors, that an English writer of zeal, learning, and

skill is interested in fixing his rank in the judgment of posterity. Hence, in a case in which it is quite conceivable that the assumed qualification or reserve may be due to the circumstance that the merits of an author may transcend, as well as be below, our standard of general excellence, we regard with some suspicion this implied compliment to our perspicacity. This suspicion is not weakened by the fact that the most effective assaults on the reputation of Macaulay have been made—not by continental writers, not by Americans—but by Englishmen. The reason is obvious. Englishmen have in greater abundance, and have readier access to, the materials by which certain statements of the essayist and historian can be verified or impugned. The qualification or reserve with which Macaulay is quoted in America will, in all likelihood, be augmented or lessened in degree precisely in the proportion in which his assumptions, inferences, and statements are effectively supported or assailed. The imputing of critical sagacity and judgment to our countrymen in matters of this kind merely amounts, when analyzed, to a compliment, reflectively, on our English friends themselves.

The value of the Continental estimate of an English author is, we think, scarcely less liable to be overstated. Germany, rather than nations foreign to it, seems to us to have fixed the generally recognized position of Goethe in the scale of intellectual eminence. What capable Englishman or American would accept as adequate the most impartial French estimate of the genius of John Milton? Even Chateaubriand could not translate the first few lines of "Paradise Lost" without perpetrating a grave error. Accordingly, in those departments of literature in which form, rather than matter, is transcendently prominent, the judgment of an educated countryman, rather than that of an educated foreigner, is likely to have final value. It was as an artist-writer that Macaulay won his fame; as a master of composition his reputation, we think, will reach a distant posterity; and that Englishmen and Americans are quite as well fitted as foreigners to judge of what constitutes genuine skill in construction we shall believe until we have further evidence to the contrary than has yet been furnished us.

To be overpraised is undoubtedly one of the serious embarrassments of intellectual distinction. Yet there are generally a few who are not even momentarily confused by the halo with which a crowd of undiscerning disciples invest an author of eminence. Many years before the *History of England* appeared, Sir James Mackintosh had affectionately chidden Macaulay for giving "too much countenance to the abuse and confusion of language exemplified in the well-known line of Pope—

'Modes of self-love the Passions we may call;'

and tenderly admonished him to "hold fast to simplicity, which survives all the fashions of deviation from it, and which a man of genius so fertile has few temptations to forsake." Nevertheless, Sir James regarded his young friend as "a writer of consummate ability," as one who, at an early age, had "mastered every species of composition."

When the reputation of Macaulay had fairly bloomed, Edgar A. Poe said of him:—

"The few who regard Macaulay as a terse, forcible, and logical writer, full of thought, and abounding in original views, often sagacious, and never otherwise than admirably expressed—appear to us precisely in the right. The many who look upon him as not only all this, but as a comprehensive and profound thinker, little prone to error, err essentially themselves."

Here praise is thoughtfully qualified by judges of recognized competence.

But it is the fate of genius to be underrated as well as overpraised; and the very intensity and multiplicity of the efforts which have been made, in high quarters, to becloud the fame of Macaulay are inversely the most significant of all proofs of the unassailable basis on which it rests. Capable men seldom have a burning desire to cast the horoscope of mediocrity. Eliminate from his reputation, if you will, whatever is due to the inaccuracies and erroneous inferences which the reviewer has assumed to exist in his "History" and "Essays," and there is scarcely a perceptible diminution in value of the splendid residue. What remains is MACAULAY. There may be many persons who, singly or in combination, might have gathered the facts in his "History;" but who, besides him, could have marshalled them in so magnificent an array? The entire train of his reasoning in the introductory paragraphs to his Essay on Ranke's *History of the Popes* seems to us to be demonstrably fallacious. Yet the manner in which the two general propositions contained in these paragraphs are set forth is, we think, justly commended by Poe "as a model for the logician and the student of *belles lettres*."

"Macaulay could never be made to understand," says the reviewer, "that there are whole classes of subjects on which certainty is unattainable."

We believe, on the contrary, that no writer of equal ability in modern times has, on the whole, more resolutely devoted himself to those subjects with respect to which certainty is approximately attainable. He did not scruple, says J. Stuart Mill, to pronounce impossible the generalization of "the modes of investigating truth and estimating evidence, by which so many important and recondite laws of nature have, in the various sciences, been aggregated to the stock of human knowledge"—a task which, we think, Mr. Mill is conceded fairly to have accomplished.

Thus, in relation to one of the most elaborate and important fields of investigation, Macaulay denied certainty to be attainable where comparative certainty has been attained.

The reviewer has endeavored, with apparent self-gratulation, to imitate what he is pleased to regard as the trick of Macaulay's style. The attempt suggests an illustration from a fine verbal critic, who regarded Macaulay as the most accurate stylist of the age.

"Painting their faces to look like Macaulay," says Poe, "some of our critics manage to resemble him, at length, as a Massaccian does a Raffaëlian virgin; and, except that the former is feebler and thinner than the other—suggesting the idea of its being the ghost of the other—not one connoisseur in ten can perceive any difference. But then, unhappily, *even the street lazzaroni can feel the distinction.*"

Feeble efforts to imitate the lively, staccato movement of the essayist have often been made; but how many, besides Macaulay, have acquired the "trick" of such writing as this:—

"A mightier poet, tried at once by pain, danger, poverty, obloquy, and blindness, meditated, undisturbed by the obscene tumult which raged all around him, a song so sublime and so holy that it would not have misbecome the lips of those ethereal Virtues whom he saw, with that inner eye which no calamity could darken, flinging down on the jasper pavement their crowns of amaranth and gold"?

In opulence, variety, and charm of illustration, Macaulay moves in a sphere all his own. To him who seeks intellectual recreation there is a fervid, healthy, robust energy in his style that is fascination itself. So marvellous is his skill in composition, that we venture to say that there are few good judges of style who have not paused, in the perusal of one of his finest passages, to examine critically the mere mechanism of his sentences. His eye, "in a fine frenzy rolling," seems to sweep the orbit of ancient and modern literature. His culture vastly enriches his genius; and his genius gives intense life and glow to everything he touches. Not only did he know how to say a thing; but he eminently had something to say. Yet, so deftly does he combine the tact of the rhetorician and the dexterity of the logician, that his diction scarcely bates one jot of elegance in passages conspicuous for argumentative skill.

1869.

IN MEMORIAM.

It is with feelings of profound sadness that we chronicle the loss of our dear and honored friend, TILLINGHAST KING COLLINS. We knew him in the full flush of health and vigor, and we witnessed the closing years of his life, when, sustained by the recollection of duties well performed, and consoled by an earnest and unquestioning faith in the Redeemer of mankind, he

"drew the drapery of his couch about him,
And lay down to pleasant dreams."

As a shock of corn fully ripe, he was gathered to the great granary of his Father.

It is spiritually healthful to linger at the shrine of the good and the true—of those who have unobtrusively "borne the burden" in the "heat of the day"—of those who, amid great tribulation, have been "weighed in the balance," and not been "found wanting."

Left, at an early age, with a widowed mother, and a younger brother and sister, to encounter the great battle of life, he went forth to the contest with a precocious understanding of the circumstances which surrounded him, and a joyous consciousness of the ultimate realization of his desire. In the darkest hour of his struggles he never for a moment lost his bounding energy; never for a moment did he "bate one jot of heart or hope;" never for a moment did he fail to show a calm and sunny temper. When success had crowned his efforts, his honors were quietly and meekly borne. Even the conspicuous reverses which occasionally marked his career were due to the abnormal development of a frank and generous nature. He always looked on the bright side of life; and when he did a favor his kindly manner of doing it enhanced immeasurably the value of the act.

T. K. COLLINS was born in this city on the 14th of October, 1802. His great-grandfather on his father's side emigrated from Ireland to Rhode Island during colonial times. His great-grandfather on his

mother's side was a Welshman, a lawyer by profession, who resided on an island in the Delaware River. His father was a sailor, and a native of Cranston, R. I. His mother was born near Trenton, N. J.

When thirteen years old he entered the wareroom of Mathew Carey, whose history during a large part of his life is the history of Philadelphia. Shortly afterwards, he was received into the printing-office of James Maxwell, at that period proprietor of one of the largest establishments in this city. From this office he graduated a thorough printer—of rare skill, energy, and fertility of invention.

From Philadelphia he removed to Washington, and was employed by Peter Force, and successively by Duff Green and Gales & Seaton, all well-known printers and publishers. Returning to Philadelphia, he entered the printing-office of James Kay, the eminent law bookseller, who had the highest appreciation of his capacity and energy. He then became foreman for Lawrence Johnson, the celebrated type-founder, and was again employed by James Kay.

In 1833, in conjunction with Robert Wright, he established a printing-office in Prune street, with but one hand-press. In 1835, a new copartnership was formed with his brother, PHILIP G. COLLINS. The new house became distinguished for energy, skill, and enterprise, and at once took rank at the very head of the typographic art.

The junior partner, P. G. COLLINS, a printer of great capacity and general knowledge, died in 1854. The business was thenceforward conducted by the senior partner.

In 1858, Mr. Collins became disabled by paralysis; but he was still competent to afford efficient co-operation in the management of his immense establishment until the year 1865, when the helm he had managed with so consummate an ability for many years had to be intrusted to others. Even from this period until within a few days of his decease his counsel and judgment were of value.


While in Washington he connected himself with the Methodist Episcopal Church, of which to the close of his life he was uninterruptedly a faithful and distinguished member. He was for many years a Director of the Public Schools of Philadelphia, in which position his strict attention to his duties and his affable manners won him many friends.


The social qualities of our departed friend were of rare excellence. His memory was a vast storehouse of anecdote, story, and apt quotation, of which his command seemed to be absolutely without limit. His playful wit and readiness at repartee rendered him one of the most companionable of men. He had a big, brave heart, which beat steadily in unison with whatever was frank, manly, straightforward, and honorable; and


he had as sunny and as beaming a countenance as ever lighted up a human frame. Kindness and benevolence were at his fingers' ends. One of the most pleasing features in his character was his courtesy in his business relations—a courtesy so magnetic as to transform, within an exceedingly short period, a casual customer into a stanch and enduring friend.

His intellect was far above the average order. Had he received a thorough intellectual training in early life, there is no profession in which he could not have attained high distinction. Greater skill than he possessed in untying a knotty point in his business it seems quite impossible to conceive. The breadth and generosity of his nature may be inferred from the fact that he had no business secrets. He imparted to any one who sought his advice the rare stores of technical information he possessed.

1870.







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